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MEA CULPA: WHY CORPORATE WAIVERS 
OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE HAVE 
NOT INCREASED THE PROSECUTION OF 
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES 
Abstract: Up until the most recent financial crisis, the Justice Department con-
sistently prosecuted individuals responsible for corporate misconduct. In recent 
times, few executives are prosecuted for their vast corporate misconduct and 
most received a deferred prosecution agreement in exchange for waiving the cor-
poration’s attorney-client privilege. This Note discusses how the waiver of attor-
ney-client privilege has, in effect, reduced the prosecution of executives respon-
sible for corporate crimes. It argues that the Justice Department must conduct its 
own investigations into corporate misconduct and should not rely on a corpora-
tion waiving its attorney-client privilege in exchange for a lenient deal. Success-
fully reducing corporate misconduct depends, in part, on the government’s ability 
to deter the individuals running the corporation, which cannot be met when leni-
ency replaces investigative work. 
INTRODUCTION 
2001: the sixth largest energy company in the world, Enron, revealed it 
overstated its earnings by hundreds of millions.1 Twenty-thousand people lost 
their jobs and twenty-four executives were convicted as a result of this scan-
dal.2 Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s former chief executive officer (CEO), and An-
drew Fastow, Enron’s former chief financial officer (CFO), were sentenced to 
twenty-four years and six years in prison respectively.3 2004–2005: World-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Enron Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www-m.cnn.com/2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-
facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/5T7S-EZGM] (explaining the Enron scandal). 
 2 See 10 Years Later: What Happened to the Former Employees of Enron?, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 
1, 2011), https://www.businessinsider.com/10-years-later-what-happened-to-the-former-employees-
of-enron-2011-12 [https://perma.cc/9Y5L-XMPM] (describing the consequences of Enron’s collapse); 
Scott Cohn, Some Enron Victims Still Trying to Recover—Massive Fraud Left Major Damage in Its 
Wake for Employees, Charities, CNBC (May 26, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12976443/ns/
business–cnbc_tv/t/some–enron–victims–still–trying–recover/#.WoHdW5M–cdU [https://perma.cc/
5W6B-EZRG] (noting former Enron employees are still suffering as a result of Enron’s demise). 
 3 See Kate Murphy & Alexei Barrionuevo, Fastow Sentenced to 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/business/27enron.html [https://perma.cc/RP9D-B7Q8] 
(explaining the fate of Enron’s former CFO). Andrew Fastow, Enron’s former CFO, was given a six-
year plea deal for his cooperation in the trial against Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling. See id. Jeffrey 
Skilling was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison but reached a deal with the Justice Department 
in 2013 to end the years of appeals that reduced his sentence to fourteen years. See Kristen Hays & 
Anna Driver, Former Enron CEO Skilling’s Sentence Cut to 14 Years, REUTERS (June 21, 2013), 
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Com’s accounting fraud was discovered, investors lost tens of billions of dol-
lars, thousands of employees were left without jobs and medical benefits, and 
WorldCom filed for the largest bankruptcy in American history.4 Ex-
WorldCom CEO, Bernard Ebbers was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison 
and ex-WorldCom CFO, Scott Sullivan, was sentenced to five years in prison.5 
Sullivan’s sentence was half the length of Enron’s former CFO’s sentence and 
twenty years less than WorldCom’s CEO’s sentence due to Sullivan’s coopera-
tion with the government.6 
2007–2008: The financial markets collapsed due in large part to faulty 
subprime mortgages.7 Millions of people lost their jobs and life savings, and 
the fallout of the crisis cost the global economy trillions of dollars.8 Banks 
such as Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Gold-
man Sachs, HSBC, MetLife Bank, and Ally Financial paid fines of over $150 
billion for their roles in selling fraudulent mortgages and making misrepresen-
                                                                                                                           
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-enron-skilling-idUSBRE95K12520130621 [https://perma.cc/
Z6ED-MLS9] (describing how Jeffrey Skilling’s sentence was reduced). 
 4 See Jennifer Bayot & Roben Farzad, Ex-WorldCom Executive Sentenced to 5 Years in Account-
ing Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/12/business/exworldcom-
officer-sentenced-to-5-years-in-accounting-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/9MAR-U8MZ] (emphasizing 
the dire situation Enron employees were left in following the collapse of the company); Terry Frieden, 
Ebbers Indicted, Ex-CFO Pleads Guilty, CNN MONEY (Mar. 2, 2004), http://money.cnn.com/2004/
03/02/technology/ebbers/ [https://perma.cc/F3U9-YTWM] (explaining the fraudulent overstatement 
by WorldCom caused the largest bankruptcy in American history). WorldCom overstated revenue and 
minimized its expenses in what amounted to an $11 billion fraud scheme. See Frieden, supra (describ-
ing the magnitude of the WorldCom scandal). 
 5 See Bayot & Farzad, supra note 4 (detailing the sentences the WorldCom executives received 
for their roles in WorldCom’s fraud); Frieden, supra note 4 (describing WorldCom’s former CFO’s 
sentence). WorldCom was once the country’s second-largest phone carrier. See Bayot & Farzad, supra 
note 4 (explaining WorldCom’s business). Under Ebbers’ and Sullivan’s leadership, employees were 
directed to overstate revenue and conceal expenses. See id. (noting how the WorldCom fraud was 
perpetuated). This scheme ultimately resulted in an $11 billion fraud that led to the company’s demise 
and subsequent bankruptcy. See Frieden, supra note 4 (detailing WorldCom’s fraud). Four other for-
mer executives were prosecuted as a result of the WorldCom scandal but received lighter sentences 
because of their cooperation with the government in building its case against Bernard Ebbers, the 
former CEO. See Bloomberg News, Ex-WorldCom Controller Sentenced to One Year, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 11, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11/business/exworldcom-controller-sentenced-to-
one-year.html [https://perma.cc/4DVZ-L6VU] (commenting on the sentences that the former execu-
tives at WorldCom received). The four executives received sentences ranging from probation to one 
year and one day in prison. See id. (describing the different lengths of sentences the former World-
Com executives received). 
 6 See Bayot & Farzad, supra note 4 (noting Sullivan’s sentence is more lenient than Enron’s for-
mer CEO received). 
 7 See Noah Rayman, Here’s How Much Banks Have Paid Out Since the Financial Crisis, TIME 
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://time.com/3154590/bank–payouts–since–financial–crisis/ [https://perma.cc/
L5JP-P5CB] (explaining the financial market collapse). 
 8 See Joseph L. Zales, $22 Trillion Lost, Zero Wall Street Executives Jailed: Prosecutors Should 
Utilize Whistleblowers to Establish Criminal Intent, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 167 
(2016) (describing the consequences of the financial crisis). 
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tations about complex investments.9 Yet, unlike Enron, only one Wall Street 
executive was convicted for his role in the crisis—the rest of the executives 
walked away unscathed.10 
2012: Federal investigators discovered that HSBC transferred billions of 
dollars for nations under sanctions by the United States, accepted money from 
a Saudi Arabian bank associated with terrorists, and allowed the Mexican drug 
cartel, Sinaloa, to launder money through the American financial system.11 In 
total, HSBC allowed, at a minimum, $811 billion of drug cartel money to be 
laundered through HSBC bank accounts.12 Yet, once again, unlike Enron and 
WorldCom, not one of HSBC’s executives faced criminal charges.13 All of 
HSBC’s executives escaped with nothing but a promise to clean up their cor-
porate culture and a fine of nearly $2 billion against the corporation.14 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Rayman, supra note 7 (noting the fines that large banks paid for their roles in the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis). In February 2012, Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, and 
Ally Financial agreed to a $25 billion settlement relating to their foreclosure techniques. See id. (ex-
plaining the settlements that large banks made). In November 2013, J.P. Morgan Chase entered into a 
$14 billion settlement with the Justice Department for “knowingly bundl[ing] toxic loans and sell[ing] 
them to unsuspected investors.” See id. (demonstrating the details in the settlements that large banks 
made in the aftermath of the financial crisis). In January 2013, March 2014, and August 2014, Bank of 
America entered into a $11.6 billion, $9.5 billion, and $16.65 billion settlement related to its faulty 
mortgages and selling them to Fannie Mae. See id. (detailing the fines Bank of America paid). 
 10 See Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-
jail-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/7LD6-PUDL] (detailing that Kareem Serageldin, a mid-
level executive at Credit Suisse, was the only executive who went to jail as a result of the financial 
crisis). Serageldin ultimately pled guilty to conspiracy to falsify books and records. See Bernard 
Vaughan, Ex-Credit Suisse Trader Pleads Guilty in U.S. Mortgage Case, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2013), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-creditsuisse-serageldin-plea/ex-credit-suisse-trader-pleads-guilty-
in-u-s-mortgage-case-idUSBRE93B0SI20130412 [https://perma.cc/574F-F3G3] (explaining the plea 
deal Serageldin took). Serageldin, a British citizen, allegedly covered Credit Suisse’s losses on sub-
prime mortgage-backed bonds by inflating their prices. See id. (providing background on the Credit 
Suisse employee that went to jail). 
 11 See Eisinger, supra note 10 (explaining HSBC’s transgressions); Patrick Radden Keefe, Why 
Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW YORKER (July 31, 2007), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-jail [https://perma.cc/W48K-8FJM] (noting the allegations 
that HSBC faced from federal investigators in 2012). The federal investigations into HSBC’s conduct 
were performed by Senate investigators. See Keefe, supra. 
 12 See Dominic Rushe & Jill Treanor, HSBC’s Record $1.9bn Fine Preferable to Prosecution, US 
Authorities Insist, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/
dec/11/hsbc-fine-prosecution-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/PB3R-8P5H] (detailing the HSBC 
scandal). Some of the egregious conduct the bank took to assist in laundering drug cartel money was 
increasing the size of windows at some of the branches so that more cash could fit through them. See 
id. (detailing HSBC’s conduct). 
 13 See Keefe, supra note 11 (explaining no criminal charges were filed against HSBC and no 
executives were prosecuted). 
 14 See id. (describing how HSBC laundered drug cartel money). The fine of almost $2 billion to 
HSBC may seem like a significant amount of money but equated to one month’s worth of profit to 
HSBC. See id. (explaining how much profit HSBC made). The fine comprised of a $1,256,000,000 
forfeiture and an agreement to pay $665,000,000 in civil penalties. See Aruna Viswanatha & Brett 
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2016: Executive culpability looked to be a relic of the past when, despite 
an admission of widespread fraud, Wells Fargo executives evaded all criminal 
consequences for their fraudulent corporate culture.15 Wells Fargo admitted 
that its employees fraudulently opened 1.5 million fictitious checking accounts 
and half a million fictitious credit cards.16 Later that same year, Wells Fargo 
discovered an additional 1.4 million fake accounts, making its total fictitious 
accounts over 3.5 million.17 Wells Fargo acknowledged its employees fraudu-
lently charged thousands of customers overdraft and maintenance fees for ac-
counts they never opened and unfairly repossessed over twenty-thousand ac-
count holders’ cars.18 Wells Fargo fired over five-thousand employees, yet, not 
one executive faced criminal charges.19 Instead, Wells Fargo walked away with 
an agreement to pay a $185 million fine and continued business as usual.20 
This leads to a major question: what changed?21 Why are modern day ex-
ecutives walking away with nothing more than a slap on the wrist and a fine?22 
                                                                                                                           
Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in Money-Laundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-probe/hsbc-to-pay-1-9-billion-u-s-fine-in-money-laundering-
case-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211 [https://perma.cc/ZNA8-L6D7] (detailing the deal between HSBC 
and the United States government). Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer defended the non-
prosecution agreement (NPA) given to HSBC by explaining that if HSBC were prosecuted, the bank 
would lose its U.S. banking license and as a result the “collateral consequences” would be dire. See 
Rushe & Treanor, supra note 12. 
 15 Jesse Singal, Why It’s Unlikely Anyone Will Go to Jail over Wells Fargo’s Massive Fraud 
Scheme, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 9, 2016), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/09/why-no-one-will-go-to-
jail-over-wells-fargos-fraud-scheme.html [https://perma.cc/Z68W-EVG3]. 
 16 See id. (explaining the Wells Fargo scandal). 
 17 Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Uncovers up to 1.4 Million More Fake Accounts, CNN MONEY (Aug. 
31, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/31/investing/wells-fargo-fake-accounts/index.html [https://
perma.cc/7S7J-R7B7]. The additional fake bank and credit cards were found in an analysis that the 
bank conducted. See id. (detailing the Wells Fargo scandal). As a result of the Wells Fargo scandal, 
Independent Directors on the Board of Wells Fargo hired Shearman & Sterling LLP to conduct an 
internal investigation to discover how the improper sales practices in the Community Banks started 
and how to fix and prevent this type of misconduct in the future. See Independent Directors of the 
Board of Wells Fargo & Company Sales Practices Investigation Report, WELLS FARGO (Apr. 10, 
2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/
board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ET6-S2H5] (reporting on the results of the internal investigation). 
 18 See Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo May Have Found More Fake Accounts Created by Employees, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-
fraud-accounts.html [https://perma.cc/MQ9B-GXDY] (uncovering more of the details behind the 
Wells Fargo scandal). 
 19 See Singal, supra note 15 (explaining why no Wells Fargo executive will go to jail over the 
scandal). 
 20 See id. (detailing the fine that Wells Fargo paid). 
 21 Compare Enron Fast Facts, supra note 1 (describing the consequences Enron executives faced 
for their misconduct), with Keefe, supra note 11 (explaining how no HSBC executive was punished 
for their alleged crimes). After the Enron scandal, twenty-four executives were convicted, yet despite 
HSBC’s alleged facilitation of laundering money, not one executive was prosecuted. Compare 10 
Years Later: What Happened to the Former Employees of Enron?, supra note 2 (detailing how many 
executives at Enron were convicted), with Keefe, supra note 11 (describing how no HSBC executive 
was indicted or convicted). Similarly, only one mid-level executive was convicted as a result of the 
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Are executives less culpable?23 Are large corporations less culpable?24 Or is 
the culture of waiver preventing the Justice Department from prosecuting 
white collar corporate crime?25 
Part I of this Note explores the history of corporate prosecution and the 
use of attorney-client waivers.26 It also discusses the waiver of attorney-client 
privilege and the policy changes within the Justice Department regarding the 
waiver of attorney-client privilege.27 Part II analyzes the difficulty of prosecut-
ing corporations, and further looks at judicial oversight over deferred prosecu-
tion agreements involving the waiver of attorney-client privilege.28 Part III 
argues that Congress should pass a statute barring the corporate waiver of at-
torney-client privilege to encourage the Justice Department to return to its pre-
vious practices of conducting independent investigations of corporate miscon-
duct to preserve the sanctity of attorney-client privilege and deter future corpo-
rate crimes.29 
                                                                                                                           
financial crisis and trading faulty sub-prime mortgages, whereas in the case of WorldCom, six execu-
tives were prosecuted and convicted for their roles in fraudulently covering WorldCom’s losses. See 
Zales, supra note 8, at 167, 177 (detailing the fates of different executives at different points in time). 
 22 See Keefe, supra note 11. HSBC allegedly laundered money for a drug cartel and a bank asso-
ciated with terrorists yet not one individual was prosecuted and the company only faced a fine of 
about $2 billion. See id. (noting the alleged crimes HSBC committed). 
 23 See Peter Henning, Why It Is Getting Harder to Prosecute Executives for Corporate Miscon-
duct, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 13, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/06/13/why-it-is-
getting-harder-to-prosecute-executives-for-corporate-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/Y5Z7-CV7B] 
(explaining that the days where high-level executives like Jeff Skilling are prosecuted are over and 
there is a “responsibility gap” between the top management and day-to-day conduct that violates the 
law). See id. (explaining that the “responsibility gap” is the gap between holding executives accounta-
ble for corporate misconduct). 
 24 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nation-
wide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 994 (1992) (detailing the pitfalls of large nationwide banks). As 
early as the 1990s legal scholars were worried that the “megamergers” in the banking industry were 
going to create a small number of banks that would be “too big to fail.” See id. at 960. “Too big to 
fail” refers to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) policy of protecting both unin-
sured and insured deposits in large banks that are failing. See id. at 994 (explaining what “too big to 
fail” is). The FDIC is an independent agency that Congress created to ensure public confidence and 
stability in the financial system. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2018–2022 STRATEGIC PLAN (2018), 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/mission.html [https://perma.cc/WZ6G-CX5M]. 
 25 See Note, Developments in White Collar Criminal Law and the Culture of Waiver, 14 BERKE-
LEY J. CRIM. L. 199, 203–04 (2009) (providing an overview of how and why white collar crime has 
evolved). The culture of waiver is the policy the Justice Department had that was viewed to encourage 
the disclosure of privileged information. See id. at 203 (explaining the culture of waiver). 
 26 See infra notes 30–128 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 30–128 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 129–182 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 183–220 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF WHITE COLLAR PROSECUTION, THE INCREASE OF 
DEFERRED PROSECUTIONS, WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT  
PRIVILEGE, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S MANY  
MEMOS ON CORPORATE PROSECUTION 
Prosecuting a corporation involves many nuances related to attorney-
client privilege, deferred prosecution agreements, and unintended collateral 
consequences.30 This Part of the Note has four sections.31 Section A gives a 
brief overview of the progression of white collar prosecution.32 Section B de-
scribes the Justice Department’s evolving guidance regarding corporate prose-
cution and how the waiver of attorney-client privilege relates to its policies.33 
Section C explains attorney-client privilege in a corporate setting.34 Section D 
details deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”).35 
A. The Ebb and Flow of White Collar Prosecution 
Criminal corporate liability emerged after a 1909 landmark case, New 
York Central and Hudson River Rail Road Company v. United States, where 
the Supreme Court found that corporations can be held criminally responsible 
for their employees’ or directors’ misdeeds.36 As a result of this landmark deci-
sion, historically after every financial downturn, corporations and their execu-
tives were prosecuted for their roles.37 For instance, in the 1980s, after the 
“junk bond” collapse and the Saving and Loan Crisis, the government re-
sponded by creating a task force to prosecute over eight-hundred bankers—
many of them executives.38 In the 2000s, after the collapse of Enron, over 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981) (discussing the complications in 
applying attorney-client privilege to a corporation); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 897, 923 (2006) (detailing the nuances of attorney-client privilege in a corporate setting); 
David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Cor-
porate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1311 (2013) (explaining that thousands of employees 
lost their jobs in the wake of the prosecution of Arthur Andersen); Frieden, supra note 4 (explaining 
that as a result of WorldCom’s fraud, WorldCom entered into the “largest bankruptcy in U.S. histo-
ry”). 
 31 See infra notes 36–128 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 36–43 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 44–84 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 85–105 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 106–128 and accompanying text. 
 36 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 489, 499 (1909); Ellen S. 
Podgor, 100 Years of White Collar Crime in “Twitter,” 30 REV. LITIG. 535, 536 (2011) (commenting 
that N.Y. Central & Hudson River Railroad is cited as the first case to impose criminal liability). 
 37See Keefe, supra note 11 (noting that the lack of prosecution after the financial crisis was a 
departure from the historic pattern of prosecuting the institutions and people responsible for the down-
turn). 
 38 See Zales, supra note 8, at 177 (noting the lack of prosecutions after the financial crisis); Jed S. 
Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
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twenty-four individuals were prosecuted.39 The Justice Department did not 
stop with Enron—it also indicted Arthur Andersen, Enron’s accounting firm, 
for its role in destroying documents related to Enron’s fraud.40 As a result of 
Arthur Andersen’s indictment, the firm collapsed and twenty-eight thousand 
employees lost their jobs.41 Fast forward to today where, in stark contrast, after 
the financial crisis in 2008, only one mid-level executive was prosecuted.42 
This drastic change in white collar prosecution can be attributed to the differ-
                                                                                                                           
(Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-
prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/E2AQ-KCF4] (providing the prosecution histories of executives). Junk 
bonds are high-yield bonds rated “BB” or lower and issued by companies that carry a large amount of 
debt or have risky business plans. See Christopher Matthews, Junk Bonds: Wall Street’s Newest Bub-
ble?, TIME (Aug. 20, 2010), http://business.time.com/2012/08/20/junk-bonds-wall-streets-newest-
bubble/ [https://perma.cc/V33R-DZT3] (describing what junk bonds are). These loans have a higher 
yield (normally 3–4% interest more) than U.S. government bonds because of their riskiness. See id. 
The junk bond bubble was perpetrated by Michel Milken and his firm, Drexel Brunham Lambert. See 
William D. Cohan, Michel Milken Invented the Modern Junk Bond, Went to Prison, and Then Became 
One of the Most Respected People on Wall Street, BUS. INSIDER (May 2, 2017), https://www.business
insider.com/michael-milken-life-story-2017-5 [https://perma.cc/T3YE-S8VW] (explaining who Mi-
chael Milken was). Milken recognized that high-yield bonds (junk bonds) were more profitable than 
traditional bonds and with his firm created a new supply of junk bonds by encouraging companies 
who could not get traditional bonds to issue bonds underwritten by Drexel Brunham. See id. (detailing 
why junk bonds became so popular). The Savings and Loan Crisis occurred from 1980–1989. See 
Kenneth J. Robinson, Savings and Loan Crisis: In the 1980s, the Financial Sector Suffered Through a 
Period of Distress That Was Focused on the Nation’s Saving and Loan Industry, FED. RESERVE HIS-
TORY (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings_and_loan_crisis [https://
perma.cc/V5NA-4Q2M] (describing what the savings and loan crisis was). Savings and Loan institu-
tions (“S&Ls”) were created in 1932 and paid lower interest rates in return for lower mortgage rates 
that promoted home ownership. See The S&L Crisis; A Chrono-Bibliography, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/sandl/ [https://perma.cc/QC74-APGK] (explaining how 
S&Ls functioned). As a result, S&Ls were affected by increased interest rates, especially during the 
1970s when the economy became more stagnant, and under the Garn-St. Germaine Act, S&Ls were 
permitted to make riskier loans and investments such as junk bonds in order to become more profita-
ble. See Peter Cohan, Today’s Financial Meltdown vs. the 1990s S&L Crisis: Which Was Worse?, 
AOL (July 3, 2010), https://www.aol.com/2010/07/03/financial-meltdown-vs-savings-loan-crisis-
recession/ [https://perma.cc/R9JP-VZK4] (explaining the fallout from the S&L crisis). When the junk 
bond market collapsed, the United States had to give the S&L industry a $220 billion bailout. See id. 
 39 See 10 Years Later: What Happened to the Former Employees of Enron?, supra note 2 (ex-
plaining that the Enron scandal resulted from the corporation deceiving investors about its true prof-
its). As a result, the company filed for bankruptcy and over twenty-one thousand employees lost their 
jobs. See Enron Scandal at-a-Glance, BBC NEWS WORLD ED. (Aug. 22, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/business/1780075.stm [https://perma.cc/42KA-VD9F] (detailing the Enron scandal). 
 40 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John-Michael Seibler, All Stick and No Carrot: The Yates Memoran-
dum and Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 STETSON L. REV. 7, 17 (2016) (explaining Arthur Ander-
sen’s role in destroying documents in the wake of the Enron scandal). 
 41 See id. (noting that despite overturning its conviction, Arthur Andersen ceased to exist and its 
employees, even the ones not working on Enron, subsequently lost their jobs). 
 42 See Eisinger, supra note 10 (commenting that only one mid-level executive was prosecuted as 
a result of the financial crisis). 
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ent policies and guidelines that the Justice Department created for its U.S. at-
torneys and their reliance on deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”).43 
B. The Justice Department’s Many Memos Instructing  
Prosecutors How to Prosecute Corporations 
Before former Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued his infamous 
memorandum known as the “Holder Memo,” federal corporate prosecutions 
were guided by the Justice Manual.44 As the prosecution of corporations be-
came more prevalent in the 1990s, Deputy Holder sought to provide federal 
prosecutors additional guidance on the matter.45 In his memorandum, Deputy 
Holder stressed that corporations should be treated the same as individuals and 
emphasized the numerous benefits of prosecuting corporations, such as being 
“a force for positive change of corporate culture.”46 One such benefit Deputy 
Holder expounded was the ability to alter corporate behavior through prosecu-
tion of corporate misconduct.47 The Holder Memo also contained a list of fac-
tors to be considered when prosecuting a corporation, such as the nature and 
seriousness of the offenses, the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corpo-
ration, the collateral consequences that would result from prosecution, and the 
corporation’s cooperation with the Justice Department.48 Of particular interest, 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See generally Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Component Heads & U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/K4MP-LVPW] [hereinafter Holder 
Memo] (promulgating the U.S. Attorney guidelines under Deputy Holder). A deferred prosecution 
agreement (“DPA”) is an agreement where the prosecutor charges a party but agrees to defer prosecu-
tion of the charges and potentially to dismiss the charges if certain conditions are met. See Uhlmann, 
supra note 30, at 1304 (explaining what a DPA is). 
 44 See Developments in White Collar Criminal Law and the Culture of Waiver, 14 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 199, 204–05 (2009) (explaining the source of guidance that U.S. Attorney’s received prior to 
the Holder Memo regarding how to prosecute). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MAN-
UAL § 9-28.1100 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 JUSTICE MANUAL] (providing guidance on how to prose-
cute). The Justice Manual instructed prosecutors to consider a corporation’s cooperation when decid-
ing whether to prosecute. See id. § 9-28.300 (listing the factors for a prosecutor to consider when 
deciding whether to prosecute a corporation). Prior to 2018, the Justice Manual was entitled the U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual, but this Note will refer to it as the Justice Manual, as it is now called. See id. 
 45 See Holder Memo, supra note 43 (commenting that federal prosecutors are faced with the crim-
inal conduct of corporations more frequently); Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1309 (noting that as corpo-
rate crime became an increased focus of prosecution within the Justice Department, Deputy Holder 
circulated a memorandum advising U.S. Attorneys on how to prosecute corporations). 
 46 See Holder Memo, supra note 43, § I (explaining that corporations should be treated the same 
as individuals, not more leniently and not more severely); Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1309 (summa-
rizing the Holder Memo). 
 47 See Holder Memo, supra note 43, § I (detailing the benefits of prosecuting corporations). 
 48 See id. (listing factors to consider when prosecuting a corporation). Collateral consequences of 
prosecuting a corporation included the harm that would occur to employees who were not personally 
culpable and the unfair harm that could befall shareholders. See id. (including collateral consequences 
as a factor for a U.S. Attorney to consider in prosecuting a corporation). 
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the Holder Memo listed the waiver of attorney-client privilege as evidence of a 
corporation’s cooperation.49 The memorandum explicitly stated that such 
waivers demonstrate a corporation’s willingness to cooperate and enable the 
government to obtain the statements of employees, who in these instances are 
often potential witnesses or targets.50 
Under the Holder Memo’s guidance, DPAs and non-prosecution agree-
ments (“NPAs”) were used sparsely prior to 2001, but after the prosecution and 
collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen, the use of DPAs increased drastical-
ly.51 To prevent future devastating business collapses related to the prosecution 
of corporate crimes, the Justice Department once again revised its guidance 
regarding prosecuting corporations.52 Specifically, in 2003, Deputy Attorney 
General Larry Thompson circulated a new memorandum, the Thompson Memo, 
that fortified the use of DPAs and NPAs as opposed to costly criminal trials.53 
The Thompson Memo is particularly notable because it contradicts the Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See id. §§ II.A.4, VI (providing examples of cooperation). The Holder Memo also listed dis-
closing the results of a company’s internal investigation, the corporation’s willingness to identify the 
individuals responsible for the conduct and a corporation’s willingness to make witnesses available as 
factors of cooperation. See id. (detailing what is considered cooperation by a corporation). These 
gauges of a corporation’s cooperation were meant to help overcome the obstacles a prosecutor would 
face when prosecuting a corporation. See id. § VI (noting the obstacles prosecutors face in prosecuting 
corporations). 
 50 See id. § VI.B (explaining why the waiver of attorney-client privilege helped the government); 
see also Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1312 (noting the Holder Memo instructed federal prosecutors to 
seek attorney-client privilege waivers as a condition of being considered cooperative). But see Bloom-
berg News, supra note 5 (explaining that four ex-WorldCom executives cooperated with prosecutors 
against WorldCom’s ex-CEO and detailing the sentencing of WorldCom’s former controller); Murphy 
& Barrionuevo, supra note 3 (commenting that Enron’s ex-CFO helped the government prosecute the 
CEO for a plea deal and not a DPA). 
 51 See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1308 (explaining the history of corporate waivers of attorney-
client privilege). From 1992–2001 the Justice Department only entered into thirteen DPAs and NPAs. 
See id. (detailing a more in-depth history of waivers of attorney-client privilege). From 2001–2014 
there were hundreds of DPAs and NPAs entered into by federal prosecutors. Brandon L. Garrett, The 
Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1802 (2015). The Justice Department was 
criticized heavily after the collapse of Arthur Andersen with claims that the prosecution was the 
equivalent of the death penalty to the firm. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1311 (explaining the back-
lash of prosecuting corporations). The Justice Department defended its prosecution of Arthur Ander-
sen due to the massive losses that Arthur Andersen fraudulently concealed for Enron and the fact that 
the firm obstructed justice by destroying documents. See id. at 1310 (for the Justice Department’s 
justification for prosecuting Anderson). 
 52 See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1311 (explaining that prior to the Memorandum from Larry 
Thompson in 2003, there was not guidance regarding the possibility of offering a corporation pretrial 
diversion). See generally Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo] (providing U.S. Attorneys with a 
manual regarding how they should prosecute corporations). 
 53 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 322 (2007) (for a summary of why U.S. Attorneys used DPAs and NPAs). Crim-
inal trials were both economically costly and costly because of the collateral consequences that could 
result, such as the bankruptcy of a company. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1303, 1310–11 (explain-
ing a criminal indictment was the equivalent to a death penalty for a corporation). 
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Manual’s express preference for plea agreements rather than NPAs.54 The Jus-
tice Manual makes it clear that NPAs and DPAs should only be used when 
there is no other means to encourage corporate cooperation—they were not 
meant as an everyday tool to avoid a costly or difficult trial.55 Unlike DPAs for 
individuals, however, DPAs for corporations were typically only granted when 
the corporation was viewed as cooperative by waiving its attorney-client privi-
lege.56 
In 2015, Sally Yates, the then Deputy Attorney General, once again modi-
fied the Justice Department’s guidelines relating to the prosecution of corpora-
tions.57 Of particular interest in the Yates Memo was its emphasis on “all or 
nothing” cooperation from corporations.58 Prior to this new guidance in the 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See 2018 JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 44, § 9-27.600.2 (dictating that plea deals are prefera-
ble to DPAs); Christopher Modlish, Note, The Yates Memo: DOJ Public Relations Move or Meaning-
ful Reform That Will End Impunity for Corporate Criminals?, 58 B.C. L. REV. 743, 758 (2017) (ex-
plaining how the Thompson Memo is unique). A DPA occurs when the government files charges but 
makes a deal with the defendant to dismiss the charges after a certain amount of time if the defendant 
follows the terms of the agreement. See United States. v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 738–39 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (describing how a DPA functions). The Justice Manual goes on to emphasize that 
even where a DPA is appropriate, a balancing test weighing the public’s interest should be conducted. 
See 2018 JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 44, § 9-27.620 (instructing the attorney for the government to 
weigh all relevant considerations such as, the importance of the investigation, the value of the per-
son’s cooperation to the investigation, the person’s culpability, and the interests of any victims when 
weighing the public’s interest in offering a NPA); Modlish, supra, at 758 (describing the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Manual). An NPA is an agreement that the Justice Department makes directly with the corpora-
tion or defendant not to prosecute them unless the defendant breaches the terms of the contract. See 
Modlish, supra, at 759 (detailing what an NPA is). 
 55 See 2018 JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 44, § 9-27.600; see also Modlish, supra note 54, at 758 
(commenting that the U.S. Attorney’s manual has an express preference for preventing a defendant 
from escaping liability for his or her conduct and an alternative to a non-prosecution agreement should 
be considered first). Originally, DPAs and NPAs were used for first-time offenders but they have been 
increasingly used against corporations. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1303 (detailing how deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements were used for a wide variety of reasons such as preserv-
ing both prosecutorial and judicial resources and avoiding the unreasonable effects on first-time of-
fenders). See 2018 JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 44, § 9-27.620 (instructing the attorney for the gov-
ernment to weigh all relevant considerations such as, the importance of the investigation, the value of 
the person’s cooperation to the investigation, the person’s culpability, and the interests of any victims 
when weighing the public’s interest in offering a NPA); Modlish, supra note 54, at 758 (describing 
the Justice Manual). 
 56 See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1304 (explaining the requirements for individuals who enter 
into a DPA). In the Thompson Memo, one of the factors of determining if a corporation is deemed 
cooperative is if it waived its attorney-client privilege. See Thompson Memo, supra note 52, at 6 (for 
the full list of factors). 
 57 See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to As-
sistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., et al. 5 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/
769036/download [https://perma.cc/GNZ2-HPQW] [hereinafter Yates Memo]. See generally Yi An 
Pan, Note, The Yates Memo: Watch Out, the DOJ Is Coming—Or Is It?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 791 
(2017) (describing the details of the Yates Memo). 
 58 See Pan, supra note 57, at 804 (detailing the “all or nothing” provision in the Yates Memo); 
Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Yates Memo: Looking for “Individual Accountability” in All the 
Wrong Places, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1897, 1900 (2017). 
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Yates Memo, corporations could get cooperation credit without disclosing the 
particular individuals responsible for the misconduct.59 Now, in order for a 
corporation to receive cooperation credit under the Yates Memo, it needed to 
disclose all facts related to the individuals responsible or involved in the cor-
porate misconduct.60 Under the Thompson Memo and prior to the Yates 
Memo, corporations could get cooperation credit without disclosing the partic-
ular individuals responsible for the misconduct.61 These large corporations 
could simply feign ignorance when it came to what individuals caused the in-
vestigation and still receive cooperation credit.62 The Yates Memo clarified 
that this conduct would no longer be acceptable and companies must now in-
vestigate the misconduct and determine which individual(s) were responsible 
for it, with particular focus on the executives.63 This reliance upon a corpora-
tion to investigate misconduct or wrongdoing within its own organization is 
not necessarily new, but the Yates Memo’s focus on finding the individual(s) 
responsible is.64 Although the Yates Memo allows corporations themselves to 
enjoy the benefits of DPAs, it specifically expresses that a prosecutor should 
not agree to any resolution that dismisses charges or provides immunity for 
individual officers and employees.65 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1907 (explaining that under the Yates Memo, corporations 
now had to turn over the individuals responsible for the misconduct in order to receive a DPA or 
NPA); Pan, supra note 57, at 804 (commenting that prior to the Yates Memo corporations could get 
cooperation credit without turning over a culpable individual). 
 60 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1900 (noting the new Yates Memo rules for corporations re-
ceiving cooperation credit). 
 61 See Pan, supra note 57, at 804 (noting under the Yates Memo corporations could no longer 
pretend to be ignorant about the culpable individuals if they wanted to receive cooperation credit). 
 62 See id. (explaining how corporations could receive cooperation credit without implicating any 
specific employee). 
 63 See Yates Memo, supra note 57, at 5 (instructing that “absent extraordinary circumstances . . . 
[d]epartment lawyers should not agree to a corporate resolution that includes an agreement to dismiss 
charges against, or provide immunity for, individual officers or employees”); Modlish, supra note 54, 
at 764 (describing the focus of the Yates Memo). 
 64 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (explaining the significance of the Yates Memo’s focus 
on individuals responsible for misconduct); Pan, supra note 57, at 804 (noting the focus on turning 
over individuals); see also Rakoff, supra note 38 (commenting on the common practice of the corpo-
ration’s counsel to ask the Justice Department to defer its investigation until the corporation has con-
ducted its own investigation). The internal investigation is then turned over in exchange for a DPA 
without the Justice Department doing its own investigation and everyone goes home feeling like it is a 
win. See id. (describing what giving a DPA to a corporation looks like); see also Copeland, supra note 
58, at 1901–02 (commenting that the Justice Department relies heavily on corporations sharing the 
results of their internal investigations). 
 65 See Yates Memo, supra note 57, at 5 (instructing U.S. attorneys that absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances, prosecutors should not agree to a resolution that requires the dismissal of charges against 
individual employees or officers). The Yates Memo also provides that prosecutors cannot release any 
individual from criminal (or civil) liability without getting it approved by the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral or United States Attorney. See id. (detailing the new rules for prosecutors). 
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Many perceived the Yates Memo’s newfound focus on the individual as 
another attempt by the Justice Department to force corporations to waive their 
attorney-client privilege.66 The Yates Memo leveraged cooperation credit in 
exchange for previously protected internal investigation information.67 Despite 
this, the Justice Department maintained that there was no pressure to waive 
attorney-client privilege because the language in the Yates Memo states that 
prosecutors should be proactive in their investigations before, during, and after 
to determine if a corporation should receive any cooperation credit.68 Yet, the 
Yates Memo explicitly states that “all relevant facts” must be disclosed to the 
Justice Department to receive any cooperation credit for a DPA, NPA, or plea 
deal.69 This requirement that “all relevant facts” must be disclosed to receive 
cooperation credit likely results in a corporation disclosing privileged material.70 
In the wake of the Yates Memo, companies under investigation seeking a 
NPA or DPA, in order to avoid a fate like Enron, began providing the Justice 
Department with information regarding the individuals responsible for the 
company’s misconduct.71 For instance, in a NPA with GNC Holdings, Inc., the 
NPA stated that the agreement was due in part to GNC’s “cooperation in this 
matter, including its providing of the Government with information about the 
conduct of individuals within and outside of GNC.”72 In a DPA between the 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1907 (explaining that the Yates Memo’s focus on a corporation 
turning over “all relevant facts” regarding culpable individuals necessitates that information protected 
by attorney-client privilege must be turned over). 
 67 See id. (concluding that the Yates Memo is another example of the Justice Department holding 
the threat of prosecution over a corporation in order to acquire a corporation’s internal investigation 
results and have the corporation waive attorney-client privilege). 
 68 See id. (explaining that the Yates Memo encourages prosecutors to investigate individuals at 
every step of the process); Yates Memo, supra note 57, at 4 (instructing prosecutors to be active in 
investigating corporate misconduct). Critics maintain that despite the Justice Department’s assertion 
that the “culture of waiver” does not exist, it does. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1908 (explaining 
the “culture of waiver” at the Justice Department). 
 69 See Yates Memo, supra note 57, at 2 (instructing prosecutors that if a corporation wants any 
cooperation credit it must turn over “all relevant facts” regarding the individuals that are culpable); 
Copeland, supra note 58, at 1907 (explaining the nuances of the Yates Memo). 
 70 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1908 (noting that the Yates Memo attacked attorney-client 
privilege and pit employers against their own employees). Corporations were expected to give up their 
culpable employees rather than face indictment. See id. at 1909 (describing the corporation’s obliga-
tions under the Yates Memo). Furthermore, unless there is an Upjohn warning given by the corpora-
tion’s counsel, many employees do not realize that the corporation can waive attorney-client privilege 
and what they reveal to corporate counsel can be used against them. See id. (detailing the potential 
consequences of the Yates Memo). An Upjohn warning is a statement made by the corporation’s 
counsel informing the corporation’s employee that the attorney represents the corporation and not the 
employee. See Ivonne Mena King & Nicholas A. Fromherz, Getting the Upjohn Warning Right in 
Internal Investigations, 17 PRAC. LITIGATOR 59, 60 (2006). 
 71 See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 72 See Non-Prosecution Agreement, United States v. GNC Holdings, Inc. (N.D.Tex. Dec. 7, 
2016), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/GNC.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H7CS-DPXH] (explaining that GNC allegedly violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
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Justice Department and PLAZA, a construction group, the Justice Department 
cited that a DPA was appropriate as a result of PLAZA’s cooperation.73 Specif-
ically PLAZA agreed to disclose all relevant information in its possession, in-
cluding information about PLAZA’s employees and officers.74 Notably missing 
from the DPA was any mention of attorney-client privilege with respect to the 
documents about PLAZA’s activities and employees that it disclosed to the 
Justice Department.75 
On paper, the Justice Department’s policy regarding cooperation has re-
mained stagnant under the current administration.76 Former Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein recently articulated that any modifications to the Yates 
Memo would focus on the Justice Department’s “resolve to hold individuals 
accountable for corporate wrongdoing.”77 Although he maintained that any 
changes made to the Yates Memo would be clarifying policy, he noted that he 
agreed with the Yates Memo that prosecutors should be wary of closing inves-
tigations without first going after any of the individuals responsible for the 
                                                                                                                           
metic Act (“FDCA”) and distributed products with false information about the ingredients). GNC is a 
global specialty health and wellness retailer. See Company Overview, GNC, https://www.gnc.
com/company-overview.html [https://perma.cc/4KX3-RKTL]. GNC sells performance supplements, 
vitamins, herbs and greens, health and beauty products as well as food. See id. (reflecting a description 
of GNC’s business). 
 73 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 17, United States v. PLAZA Constr. LLC, No. 1:16-cr-
00532 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2016), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/
agreements/plaza-construction.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8XQ-DVED] (explaining a DPA was appropri-
ate because of PLAZA’s cooperation). PLAZA allegedly conspired to commit mail fraud and wire 
fraud by adding fees to clients’ construction bills that were not actually incurred. See id. at 9–10 (ex-
plaining PLAZA’s alleged illegal conduct). PLAZA is a construction management and general con-
tracting firm. See Who We Are, PLAZA CONSTRUCTION, https://www.plazaconstruction.com/profile/
profile/ [https://perma.cc/36U6-RPMV] (providing background information on PLAZA). 
 74 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 73, at 6 (explaining PLAZA’s prior and ongo-
ing cooperation was a material factor in the Justice Department agreeing to a DPA). PLAZA was 
additionally required to take remedial actions as part of the DPA that included establishing a general 
counsel position, creating a Compliance Department, developing a Compliance Committee, holding 
an annual training for all non-union employees and officers on ethics and relevant laws to construction 
projects, creating an ethics hotline for employees to report ethics violations, ensuring that PLAZA 
does not bill its clients for more than the contracts permit, and revamping its time sheet and billing 
policies. See id. (detailing the agreement between PLAZA and the prosecutors). 
 75 See generally id. (finding no mention of attorney-client privilege in the DPA). 
 76 See generally Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at 
the New York University School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (Oct. 6, 
2017), in COMPLIANCE & ENF’T, https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/10/06/nyu-
program-on-corporate-compliance-enforcement-keynote-address-october-6-2017/ [https://perma.
cc/7RC8-T5CP] (explaining that when the Justice Department issues new policies regarding prosecu-
tion it will be an update to the U.S. Attorney’s Manual rather than a memo). 
 77 See id. (Deputy Rosenstein agreed with Sally Yates that prosecutors should be careful about 
settling corporate prosecutions without going after the individuals responsible for the conduct). 
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corporation’s misconduct.78 Remarkably missing from the Deputy’s speech 
was any mention of attorney-client privilege or the waiver thereof.79 
In reality, DPAs under the current administration of the Justice Depart-
ment include language protecting attorney-client privilege but the cooperation 
credit remains tied to providing evidence of individual misconduct.80 For in-
stance, in a recent 2017 DPA entered into by SBM Offshore and the Justice 
Department, the agreement states that, going forward, the company will dis-
close all information not protected under attorney-client privilege.81 Yet, in the 
section describing why the DPA was appropriate, the agreement states that 
SBM received full credit for its cooperation with the investigation, including 
conducting a complete internal investigation and making presentations regard-
ing this investigation to the U.S. Attorneys.82 Furthermore, SBM provided “all 
relevant facts” to the Justice Department, assisting their prosecution of the cul-
pable individuals.83 The initial language regarding protecting attorney-client 
privilege seems to conflict with providing the Justice Department with “all 
relevant facts” and briefing the Justice Department regarding the results of 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. (describing Deputy Rosenstein’s speech regarding corporate prosecution). 
 79 See generally id. (reflecting the speech by Deputy Rosenstein regarding the Justice Depart-
ment’s policies). NPAs under the Sessions-led Justice Department also mention a corporation’s coop-
eration. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, United States v. RBS Secs. Inc. (D.Conn. Oct. 25, 2017) 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1006796/download [https://perma.cc/7JVY-6WA6] (noting that the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office will not criminally prosecute RBS in part because of RBS’s extensive cooperation); 
Non-Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Prime Partners SA (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/989741/download [https://perma.cc/VF7P-ETCL] (cit-
ing the corporation’s “extraordinary cooperation with the office”). 
 80 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. SBM Offshore, N.V., No. 17-cr-00686 
(S.D.Tex. Nov. 29, 2017), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/
sbm-offshore-dpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/X44A-ZFU7] (mentioning attorney-client privilege). 
 81 See id. (detailing what the DPA between SBM and the Justice Department contained). SBM 
Offshore was alleged to have partaken in a bribery scheme in Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Iraq, 
and Kazakhstan from 1996 to 2012. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, SBM Offshore N.V. and 
the United States-Based Subsidiary Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case Involving Bribes in 
Five Countries (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sbm-offshore-nv-and-united-states-
based-subsidiary-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-case [https://perma.cc/8YXH-CLFS] (describ-
ing the crimes SBM allegedly committed). The DPA did not include any protection for individuals 
and in fact two executives with the company were prosecuted by the Justice Department and took a 
plea deal. See id. (explaining the DPA). SBM Offshore designs, installs, supplies, and operates float-
ing production systems for the offshore energy industry. See Company Profile, SBM OFFSHORE, 
https://www.sbmoffshore.com/who-we-are/company-profile/ [https://perma.cc/VXA6-R7NF] (for a 
background on SBM’s business). 
 82 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 80 (providing details of the SBM DPA). 
 83 See id. (explaining that the DPA was appropriate because SBM provided “all relevant facts” to 
the Justice Department including those about the individuals responsible for the misconduct). The “all 
relevant facts” language is the same as the Yates Memo. See Yates Memo, supra note 57, at 5 (in-
structing prosecutors to only consider deals if “all relevant facts” are turned over). 
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SBM’s internal investigation, all information that would likely be protected by 
attorney-conflict privilege.84 
C. Deferred Prosecution Agreements—the Federal Prosecutors’ Sweetheart 
DPAs have long been tools used within the U.S. Attorneys’ Office as a 
means of pretrial diversion, but until recently they were primarily used for ju-
veniles, first-time offenders, and drug offenders.85 Now, DPAs are increasingly 
used in the prosecution of corporations.86 A DPA is an agreement where the 
prosecutor charges a party but agrees to defer prosecution of the charges and 
potentially to dismiss the charges if certain conditions are met.87 When a DPA 
is used, the prosecutor still must formally initiate prosecution.88 In exchange 
for the deferral of charges, the defendant is usually required to recognize and 
admit responsibility for the misconduct, agree to terms of rehabilitation, and 
pay restitution to any victims.89 If at the end of the “deferral” period, the pros-
ecutor finds the defendant met the conditions of the DPA, the charges are dis-
missed.90 If the prosecutor finds the defendant has breached the agreement dur-
ing the deferral period, charges may be brought and the prosecutor can use any 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 80 (explaining that the DPA was appropriate 
because SBM provided “all relevant facts” to the Justice Department including those about the indi-
viduals responsible for the misconduct). As a result of the investigation, the Justice Department prose-
cuted two executives, which resulted in two separate plea deals. See Press Release, supra note 81 
(detailing the results of the internal investigation into SBM). 
 85 See Allen R. Brooks, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 147 
(2010) (commenting that DPAs were an alternative for juveniles and first-time offenders who would 
face stigma if convicted criminally); Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1303 (detailing that deferred prosecu-
tion and non-prosecution agreements were used for a wide variety of reasons such as conserving pros-
ecutorial and judicial resources and avoiding the severe effects on first-time offenders). 
 86 See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1312. After the collapse of Arthur Andersen, the Justice De-
partment used DPAs much more frequently with corporations to avoid collateral consequences. See id. 
(providing examples of what the collateral consequences of prosecuting corporations are). 
 87 See id. at 1304 (describing a DPA). 
 88 See Fokker, 818 F.3d at 738–39 (explaining under a DPA, the prosecution initiates charges but 
agrees to dismiss them if the defendant follows the conditions of the agreement). Once charges are 
initiated against a defendant the parties must go before the court to obtain a waiver from the Speedy 
Trial Act’s requirement that a criminal trial begin within seventy days from when the defendant is 
charged or makes an initial appearance. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 
130 (2d Cir. 2017) (detailing the Speedy Trial Act requirements). The parties must obtain this waiver 
or the charges will be dismissed. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2012) (dictating the rules 
behind a speedy trial). 
 89 See Fokker, 818 F.3d at 738–39 (explaining what a defendant generally concedes in order to 
get a more lenient deal); Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1304 (noting that the defendant usually must 
admit guilt to get a DPA). 
 90 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of 
Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (2005) (describing the 
dynamic between prosecutors and the judiciary). 
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self-incriminating evidence and admissions obtained during the DPA.91 There-
fore, once an individual or corporation enters into a DPA, it is a commitment to 
future cooperation as any admissions can be used against them if they fail to 
comply with the terms of the DPA.92 DPAs are viewed as a halfway point be-
tween a plea agreement and the declination of prosecution.93 
Corporate prosecution has long involved aspects of voluntary self-
regulation and cooperation with the government.94 The reality is, the govern-
ment does not have the resources to prosecute every corporation allegedly in-
volved in misconduct.95 As a result of this economic constraint, federal prose-
cutors rely heavily on DPAs and NPAs to incite corporations to cooperate ful-
ly.96 Corporations are motivated to cooperate with the government in exchange 
for a DPA, NPA, or more lenient sentencing so that they may avoid the disas-
trous fates like those of Enron, WorldCom, or Arthur Andersen.97 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Fokker, 818 F.3d at 738. One of the benefits of a DPA is that during the deferral period, the 
government can attach various conditions to the DPA and monitor the defendant’s actions. See United 
States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2015) (providing a reason why a prosecu-
tor would agree to a DPA). 
 92 See Griffin, supra note 53, at 322 (explaining that when a corporation enters into a DPA it is a 
commitment to cooperate because the corporation likely will have had to take full responsibility for 
any corporate misconduct that makes it difficult to defend against a future indictment). The Justice 
Manual states that a DPA can be appropriate for corporations because it acts to repair the corpora-
tion’s integrity while maintaining the government’s ability to prosecute a corporation if it fails to live 
up to the DPA agreement. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1314 (detailing why DPAs were originally 
used). 
 93 See Griffin, supra note 53, at 321 (explaining DPAs are viewed as a middle ground between 
deciding not to prosecute and an outright guilty plea). Deferred prosecutions are seen by some as a 
type of probation because the government is agreeing not to prosecute if certain conditions are ad-
hered to by the defendant. See id. Alternatives to a DPA would be non-prosecution, a trial, or a plea 
deal. See Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 13 (noting the reason behind DPAs). 
 94 See Griffin, supra note 53, at 316 (detailing the history of corporate prosecution). 
 95 See Brown, supra note 30, at 902 (explaining attorney-client privilege); Sarah Helene Duggin, 
The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and 
Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 345 (2008) (noting prosecutors justify corporations’ 
cooperation as a means of leveraging the government’s resources and holding powerful corporations 
responsible for their misdeeds); Griffin, supra note 30, at 340. 
 96 See Brooks, supra note 85, at 149–50 (noting that the Justice Department realized how useful 
DPAs and NPAs were in prosecuting corporations as evidenced by the Holder Memo, which did not 
require prosecutors to follow the standard guidelines for using NPAs and DPAs when they were pros-
ecuting a corporation). 
 97 See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1664 
(2007) (noting how firms argue that an indictment is the death penalty for a business and therefore 
forces a company to accept liability and settle before they are even formally charged); Griffin supra 
note 53, at 317–18 (commenting that the sentencing guidelines provided “carrots” to encourage corpo-
rations to cooperate and “sticks” to punish uncooperative corporations). DPAs are different from 
NPAs because under a DPA, charges are formally filed with the court whereas under an NPA there is 
an agreement between the Justice Department and the corporation with no judicial oversight. See 
Fokker, 818 F.3d at 738 (noting that NPAs are different from DPAs because no formal charges are 
filed and the agreement is overseen by the parties instead of the court). See Uhlmann, supra note 30, 
at 1311 (explaining that thousands of employees lost their jobs in the wake of the prosecution of Ar-
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Today, DPAs are being used with vigor—for example, HSBC recently en-
tered into a DPA.98 According to a Senate report, HSBC helped both a Saudi 
bank connected with terrorism and Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel launder money into 
the United States.99 Instead of fighting against a charge of money laundering, 
HSBC agreed to a DPA and paid a fine of almost two billion dollars.100 This is 
just one of the four hundred plus DPAs that the Justice Department used for cor-
porations from 2002–2016.101 Although some officials in the Justice Department 
wanted to prosecute HSBC and its executives, the fear of collateral consequenc-
es much like those in the wake of Enron or Arthur Andersen prevailed.102 Unlike 
a trial, where a guilty verdict is not guaranteed, a deferred prosecution agreement 
                                                                                                                           
thur Andersen); see also Rushe & Treanor, supra note 12 (explaining how U.S. officials defended the 
decision not to prosecute HSBC for its role in laundering drug cartel money on the idea that the col-
lateral consequences would be devastating to the U.S. economy). Arthur Andersen was a large ac-
counting firm before it was prosecuted for its role in the Enron scandal and ultimately had to file for 
bankruptcy. See Alexander A. Zendeh, Note, Can Congress Authorize Judicial Review of Deferred 
Prosecution and Nonprosecution Agreements? And Does It Need To?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1451, 1456 
(2017) (noting Arthur Andersen went bankrupt and ceased to exist after the government indicted it). 
The Justice Manual sanctions DPAs when the collateral consequences of prosecuting and convicting a 
corporation would be significant to third parties that are innocent. See 2018 JUSTICE MANUAL, supra 
note 44, § 9-28.1100 (2015) (providing the guidelines to U.S. Attorneys). The Justice Manual goes on 
to explain that a DPA or NPA would be appropriate because it would not result in harm to innocent 
third parties that were removed from the corporation’s misconduct and it is a way to reestablish integ-
rity in the corporation. See id. (noting why a DPA or NPA would be an acceptable deal). 
 98 See Keefe, supra note 11 (providing details regarding the HSBC DPA). 
 99 See id. (detailing the alleged criminal actions of HSBC). It was estimated that HSBC helped 
Mexican drug cartels launder at least $881 billion through HSBC bank accounts. See Rushe & 
Treanor, supra note 12. Mexican drug cartels would deposit hundreds of thousands of dollars into 
HSBC accounts daily. See id. (describing the drug laundering by Mexican drug cartels). 
 100 See Rushe & Treanor, supra note 12 (noting that the fine the company was assessed was 
equivalent to four weeks of profit for the bank). 
 101 See Keefe, supra note 11 (explaining how many DPAs and NPAs were entered into by the 
Justice Department). 
 102 See id. (explaining that Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer warned U.S. authorities that the 
prosecution of HSBC might lead to severe implications for the financial market). The DPA with 
HSBC was a five-year agreement that required HSBC to install independent monitors to change the 
bank’s current internal controls. See Rushe & Treanor, supra note 12 (providing the details of the 
DPA with HSBC). When Enron collapsed and subsequently filed for bankruptcy, thousands of em-
ployees lost their jobs and $60 billion of market value was wiped out. See 10 Years Later: What Hap-
pened to the Former Employees of Enron?, supra note 2 (explaining the consequences of Enron’s 
collapse). The $60 billion in market value loss was a massive collateral consequence to the sharehold-
ers of Enron. See id. One employee who worked at Enron as a plant manager for thirty years lost his 
entire retirement savings worth $1.3 million as a result of the Enron scandal. See id. As a result of 
indicting Arthur Andersen for its role in covering up Enron’s massive losses, the collateral conse-
quences included 28,000 employees of Arthur Andersen losing their jobs and the subsequent bank-
ruptcy. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1311 (describing the consequences of Arthur Andersen’s de-
mise). There were individuals within the Justice Department who wanted to indict HSBC but ultimate-
ly the Justice Department was troubled by the collateral consequences of indicting HSBC. See Keefe, 
supra note 11 (regarding why collateral consequences were of such concern to the Justice Depart-
ment). 
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is a safe bet.103 Yet, many of the corporations that enter into DPAs fail to admit 
the extent of their wrongdoing and/or fail to name even one executive or director 
that was culpable for the corporation’s misconduct, meaning this “safe bet” for 
the prosecution equates to a mere fine for the corporations.104 Thus, notwith-
standing the origins of DPAs, drug offenders are currently less likely to be of-
fered DPAs than large corporations deemed “too big to jail.”105 
D. Attorney-Client Privilege in a Corporate Setting 
Attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest privileges recognized in the 
United States.106 The privilege was created to protect and prevent the disclo-
sure of confidential communications made between an attorney and a client for 
the purpose of seeking legal advice.107 It is deeply rooted in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, where it was considered ungentlemanly for a lawyer to testify 
against his or her client.108 The justification for the recognition of attorney-
client privilege is primarily based on the need for confidence and trust within 
the relationship.109 In order for a lawyer to advocate effectively and zealously 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1791 (explaining that when prosecutors do charge individuals 
involved in corporate misconduct it often results in a significant number of losses). A DPA is consid-
ered a sure bet because the company must admit to certain facts and adhere to the conditions that the 
government sets, in contrast to the low conviction rate of individual prosecutions. See id. (explaining 
the benefits of DPAs). For example, in a study of convictions from 2001 to 2014, only 10% of indi-
viduals who allegedly engaged in corporate misconduct were convicted at trial. Id. 
 104 See Keefe, supra note 11 (explaining that when corporations enter into DPAs, the corporations 
will often acknowledge some level of criminal wrongdoing yet not name one person who was respon-
sible for that wrongdoing). 
 105 See id. (noting that the Justice Department rarely offers DPAs to drug offenders even though 
DPAs were originally designed for drug offenses). DPAs were originally designed for first-time drug 
offenders and juveniles. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1303 (describing the origins of DPAs). 
 106 See Susan B. Heyman, Corporate Privilege and an Individual’s Right to Defend, 85 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1112, 1132 (2017) (providing a history of attorney-client privilege); Emily Jones, 
Keeping Client Confidences: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Light of United 
States v. Adlman, 18 PACE L. REV. 419, 421 (1998) (detailing the importance and history of attorney-
client privilege); see Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (noting attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege 
known in common law). Spousal privilege is another privilege that is rooted in English and American 
common law. See Kimberly Ann Connor, A Critique of the Marital Privileges: An Examination of the 
Marital Privileges in the United States Military Through the State and Federal Approaches to the 
Marital Privileges, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 134 (2001) (explaining spousal privilege). Historically, 
spouses were considered to be incompetent to testify for or against their spouse because a husband and 
wife were considered one person. See id. (describing the evolution of spousal privilege). 
 107 See Heyman, supra note 106, at 1132 (detailing attorney-client privilege). 
 108 See id. at 1133 (reflecting an overview of the importance of attorney-client privilege); Jones, 
supra note 106, at 421–22 (noting that the attorney-client privilege was created to prevent an attorney 
from testifying against his client because it would violate his honor as a gentleman). 
 109 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (finding the attorney-client privilege is necessary to “encourage 
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients”); Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is based on the need for confidence and 
trust in the attorney-client relationship); Jones, supra note 106, at 424 (explaining that Upjohn found 
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for his or her client, a client must trust the attorney enough to speak candidly 
and openly.110 Although the attorney-client privilege has been codified under 
many state laws, Congress chose to allow federal courts to develop the privi-
lege in “light of reason and experience.”111 
To invoke attorney-client privilege, four elements must be met: (1) it must 
be a communication; (2) made between an attorney and his or her client; (3) in 
confidence; (4) for the primary purpose of seeking legal advice.112 Historically 
the privilege was held by the attorney, however, today it is held by the client.113 
Therefore, the client is the one to decide whether to assert or waive the privi-
lege.114 
The attorney-client privilege is not limited to individuals—it can also be 
asserted by corporations.115 In 1981, in Upjohn v. United States, the United 
States Supreme Court extended this privilege to cover communication made by 
employees of the corporation.116 Instead of drafting a set of rules that applied 
to all situations involving statements made by a corporation’s employees to its 
counsel, the Supreme Court dictated that this must be decided on a case-by-
                                                                                                                           
that attorney-client privilege is needed to ensure honest and complete communication, thus enabling 
the lawyer to provide sound legal advice). 
 110 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (explaining why attorney-client privilege exists); Heyman, supra 
note 106, at 1133 (detailing the importance of attorney-client privilege). 
 111 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (noting the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the authority for 
federal courts to develop the testimonial privileges in criminal trials “in the light of reason and experi-
ence”). “In the light of reason and experience” means that federal courts are permitted to develop the 
rules of privilege flexibly and on a case-by-case basis. See id. (explaining the flexibility of attorney-
client privilege). Having an open-ended privilege that should be interpreted according to reason and 
experience allows the privilege to change with time. See id. (defending why attorney-client privilege 
should evolve over time). 
 112 See Heyman, supra note 106, at 1133 (detailing the four elements of attorney-client privilege). 
Although communications are protected between an attorney and client, the privilege does not protect 
the underlying facts. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (noting that privilege only protects the communica-
tions and not the underlying facts); Brown, supra note 30, at 909 (noting the limitations of attorney-
client privilege). 
 113 See Jones, supra note 106, at 422 (explaining the history of attorney-client privilege); see also 
United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that attorney-client privilege 
dates back to the 1600s). One theory is that attorney-client privilege was a response to testimonial 
compulsion that arose in Elizabethan England. See Jones, supra note 106, at 422 (describing why 
attorney-client privilege has remained so important in law). 
 114 See Jones, supra note 106, at 422 (noting the client determines whether a communication 
made to his or her attorney may be disclosed or waived). 
 115 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (explaining the Court has settled that attorney-client privilege 
applies to corporations); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n., 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963) 
(concluding attorney-client privilege extends to corporations); Jones, supra note 106, at 425 (explain-
ing that attorney-client privilege can be used by a corporation); see also Heyman, supra note 106, at 
1134 (noting Radiant was the first federal case to hold that the privilege applies to corporations). 
 116 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386 (holding that the communications by Upjohn’s employees to 
counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege). 
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case basis.117 Despite the fact that communications by a corporation’s employ-
ees to its counsel are protected under the attorney-client privilege, only the 
corporation holds the privilege and not the individual employee that made the 
privileged communication.118 Thus, the corporation and not the individual em-
ployee maintains the power to either assert or waive the privilege.119 
To understand why the Justice Department may rely on the waiver of at-
torney-client privilege, it is essential to understand how a corporation protects 
itself during an investigation.120 When a corporation is implicated in miscon-
duct, it often conducts an internal investigation.121 A corporation protects itself 
during an investigation by directing its own attorneys to conduct the internal 
investigation, rather than a government agency.122 Because the investigation is 
done by the corporation’s counsel, the results of the internal investigation, 
meaning any interviews conducted during the investigation and/or memoran-
dum related to the investigation, are protected by attorney-client privilege as 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See id. at 396–97 (explaining the nuances of extending attorney-client privilege to corpora-
tions); Jones, supra note 106, at 425 (noting the Supreme Court found that corporation attorney-client 
privilege must be decided on a case-by-case basis). In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger 
sought to create a general rule of what to test to determine if an employee’s communication was privi-
leged. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (explaining the general rule for an em-
ployee’s communication to be privileged). His general rule considered communications to be protect-
ed by attorney-client privilege if: (1) the employee made the communication under the authorization 
of management; (2) the communication concerned matters within the scope of the employee’s duties; 
and (3) the communication related to whether the employee’s conduct would bind the corporation, 
assessing any legal consequences of that conduct, or creating a legal response to actions related to that 
conduct. See id. (detailing the test of privileged communication by an employee). 
 118 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90 (majority opinion) (explaining it is complicated that the cor-
poration itself is the holder of the attorney-client privilege and not the employees). 
 119 See id. (noting only the corporation can waive attorney-client privilege). 
 120 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (detailing how a corporation protects itself during a 
government investigation). 
 121 See id. (explaining that when a corporation is accused of misconduct, it conducts an internal 
investigation to prepare for potential litigation); see also American College of Trial Lawyers, The 
Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investiga-
tions, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 317 (2003) [hereinafter Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege] (noting 
that when a company learns of accusations of illegal conduct it will normally conduct an internal 
investigation to discover if it is substantiated or how large the extent of wrongdoing is and what the 
potential liability from it could be). 
 122 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (explaining how a corporation acts when it receives 
notice it is being investigated); Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 121, at 317 (not-
ing corporations may conduct an internal investigation when they learn of a potential government 
investigation). A corporation protects the internal investigation by having it done by outside counsel 
and thus attorney-client privilege applies. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (explaining who con-
ducts the corporation’s internal investigation); Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 
121, at 317 (providing more details on internal investigations by corporations). One of the primary 
purposes of conducting an internal investigation is to determine the potential liability the corporation 
faces and prepare a defense for any misconduct. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (describing 
why a corporation conducts an internal investigation); Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra 
note 121, at 317 (explaining the rationale behind internal investigations). 
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attorney work-product; thus, the corporation can protect itself by choosing not 
to reveal this privileged information.123 
Because the documents in an internal investigation are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, in order for the prosecutors to obtain the investigation 
results, the companies must waive said privilege.124 A corporation is primarily 
motivated to waive the attorney-client privilege in exchange for a DPA or 
NPA.125 Thus, the Justice Department is able to nudge corporations into a DPA 
in exchange for the confidential work product of the attorney.126 The corpora-
tion must then do its own investigation of culpability and turn that privileged 
information over to the Justice Department.127 After the Justice Department 
receives the results from the internal investigation, it will decide whether to 
prosecute the corporation or grant leniency in the form of a DPA or NPA.128 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (noting the results of the internal investigation, if done 
properly, are protected by attorney-client privilege). Copeland goes on to state that the only protection 
available to a corporation is the attorney-client privilege because corporations are not protected by the 
Fifth Amendment, the right to protect oneself against self-incrimination. See id. (explaining why at-
torney-client privilege is especially important to a corporation). 
 124 See id. (describing how prosecutors would obtain the results of the internal investigation). 
 125 See id. at 1910 (explaining that corporations often feel coerced to waive attorney-client privi-
lege to receive cooperation credit); Zendeh, supra note 97, at 1456 (commenting that NPAs and DPAs 
are desirable because of the consequences a corporation could face if they are convicted). Corpora-
tions want a DPA or NPA so that they do not get indicted and risk the same fate as Arthur Andersen. 
See Zendeh, supra note 97, at 1456 (noting Arthur Andersen went bankrupt and ceased to exist after 
the government indicted it). Both Enron and Arthur Andersen ended up bankrupt after prosecution by 
the Justice Department. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1311 (commenting on the demise that Enron 
and Arthur Andersen ultimately faced); Enron: The Real Scandal, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 17, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/940091 [https://perma.cc/25LH-PZ4M] (explaining the demise of 
Enron). 
 126 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1791 (providing why a corporation might agree to cooperate 
with prosecutors). A DPA is a sure deal because at trial there is no guarantee the corporation will be 
found innocent. See id. (finding that when individuals are prosecuted, there is a 10% chance the trial 
results in conviction). If a corporation is able to secure a DPA and follows the terms of the DPA, after 
a certain amount of time the charges will be dropped. See Fokker, 818 F.3d at 738–39 (describing that 
under a DPA, the prosecution initiates charges but agrees to dismiss). 
 127 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (describing what corporations must do to receive coop-
eration credit under the Yates Memo). Even when a corporation does waive attorney-client privilege 
and enters a DPA or NPA, compliance requirements relating to the DPA or NPA are rarely adopted. 
See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1828 (noting the truth about DPAs and NPAs). 
 128 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 (explaining the processes of the Justice Department); 
Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 30 (noting that because of the obstacles of prosecuting corpora-
tions and individuals within the corporation, it is not surprising that the government enlists private 
parties to do the investigating). Some critics argue that the Justice Department’s reliance on internal 
investigations is not necessary and its heavy reliance on corporations’ own internal investigations is 
the result of policy decisions made by the Justice Department. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1902 
(explaining the critiques of the Justice Department’s reliance on internal investigations). 
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II. RECONCILING PROSECUTING CORPORATIONS WITH THE  
WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
There is no question that the prosecution of a corporation can be tanta-
mount to a “death sentence” which is why, in part, the Justice Department re-
lies so heavily on DPAs.129 Notwithstanding, the Justice Department’s use of 
DPAs may encourage, if not demand, the waiver of attorney-client privilege 
that may be eroding one of the oldest privileges in law.130 This portion of the 
Note proceeds in three sections.131 The first section analyzes the difficulties in 
prosecuting corporations.132 The second section discusses the problems with 
tying DPAs to the waiver of attorney-client privilege.133 The last section de-
scribes the judicial branch’s role in overseeing the DPAs that often result from 
the waiver of attorney-client privilege.134 
A. The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporations 
White collar crimes are notoriously difficult to prosecute because, unlike 
robbery or burglary, white collar crimes often involve complex fact patterns 
and may have vast collateral consequences.135 As Deputy Holder explained, 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1303, 1310–11 (explaining that a criminal indictment was the 
equivalent to a death penalty for a corporation). 
 130 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1825 (detailing the critique of the Justice Department and its use 
of waivers); Jones, supra note 106, at 421 (explaining the history of attorney-client privilege). 
 131 See infra notes 135–182 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 135–148 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 149–161 and accompanying text. 
 134 See infra notes 162–182 and accompanying text. 
 135 See Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 26 (explaining why white collar crimes are difficult to 
prosecute); Keefe, supra note 11 (detailing why corporate bankers avoid jail). In the twenty-first cen-
tury, the Department of Justice cracked down on corporate misconduct by prosecuting WorldCom, 
Enron, and Arthur Andersen. See Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 17 (providing a history of corpo-
rate prosecution). The problem with prosecuting these corporations was that there were vast collateral 
consequences. See id. (explaining that as a result of the Arthur Andersen prosecution, around 28,000 
employees lost their jobs and most employees had nothing to do with the Enron scandal and destroy-
ing documents). Due to the massive collateral consequences from the Enron and Arthur Andersen 
litigation, the Justice Department sought to use DPAs and NPAs to mitigate any future collateral con-
sequences to innocent individuals, like employees and shareholders. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 
1312 (noting the collateral consequences of prosecuting Enron and Arthur Andersen). Corporate pros-
ecution is also so difficult because it takes an incredible amount of time and resources. See Garrett, 
supra note 51, at 1829 (finding that many of the prosecution losses of corporations can be attributed in 
some part to the vast amount of resources the defense has). For instance, Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s 
former CEO, was not sentenced until 2006 despite the prosecution beginning in 2002 and then had his 
sentence reduced in 2013. See id. (explaining the difficulties of prosecuting executives). Due to the 
Enron and Arthur Andersen collapses, prosecutors and the Justice Department have become reluctant 
to indict large corporations for fear they would drive them out of business too. See Alexander C. 
Kaufman, How Obama’s Failure to Prosecute Wall Street Set the Stage for Trump’s Win, HUFFING-
TON POST (July 11, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chickenshit–club_us_5963fcc6e4b
005b0fdc7bacb [https://perma.cc/PH9W-HT6B] (commenting on the lack of prosecution of the indi-
viduals responsible for the financial crisis under President Obama). 
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criminal prosecutions of the individuals responsible for corporate misconduct 
are often challenging due to the difficulty of establishing intent, the adequacy 
of written disclosures, and the reality of how far removed some executives can 
make themselves from the day-to-day operations of the company.136 Even 
when prosecutors charge corporations and their executives, the prosecutors 
often lose, and even when they win, the individuals often get fairly light sen-
tences, averaging only eighteen months.137 
The challenges of prosecuting a corporation are further exemplified by 
the fact that a corporation is an artificial entity that somehow can be held crim-
inally liable but physically cannot go to jail.138 Therefore, the prosecution of a 
corporation often results in fines alone.139 The corporation is held responsible 
for the acts of the individuals and the individuals can skate by with no conse-
quences.140 Meanwhile, the fines that the corporations have to pay hurt inno-
cent shareholders rather than the individuals who were responsible for miscon-
                                                                                                                           
 136 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1824 (citing Deputy Holder’s remarks on a speech about finan-
cial fraud). The Yates Memo also contains similar language explaining how difficult it is to prosecute 
high-level executives. See Yates Memo, supra note 57, at 2 (explaining it is difficult to determine who 
made corporate decisions at different levels of the corporation). 
 137 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1791–92 (finding that of the 10% of individuals convicted at 
trial, their average sentence was eighteen months which is substantially lower than the average sen-
tence for most other federal crimes). 
 138 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (holding 
corporations could be held liable for criminal acts performed by employees); Garrett, supra note 51, at 
1790; see also Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 13 (explaining that holding corporations responsi-
ble for their employees’ criminal actions prevented them from harming the public with no conse-
quences). Corporations are easier to prosecute because they can be prosecuted if any individual com-
mitted a crime while in the scope of his or her employment, which provides leverage to prosecutors. 
See Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 30 (explaining why prosecuting corporations should be easi-
er). In fact, white collar defense lawyers believe that it is so difficult to prosecute individuals for cor-
porate misconduct because the government does not have as much leverage over the individuals. See 
Garrett, supra note 51, at 1824 (providing the opinion of defense lawyers in why the Justice Depart-
ment prosecutors face challenges in prosecuting individuals for corporate misconduct). 
 139 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1792–93 (detailing the common results of prosecuting corpora-
tions); Keefe, supra note 11 (commenting that no individuals went to jail after HSBC allegedly helped 
launder money into the U.S. financial markets for drug cartels and banned countries, and that instead 
the bank was fined $2 billion). 
 140 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1790 (detailing corporate prosecutions); Keefe, supra note 11 
(explaining the reasons bank executives avoid jail); see also Eisinger, supra note 10 (noting that after 
HSBC allegedly helped launder money through the American financial system for drug cartels and 
banned countries, no executive was prosecuted and the company itself just had to pay a fine). 
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duct in the first place.141 In fact, the majority of the time, no individual or cor-
porate officer is prosecuted when corporations receive a DPA.142 
For prosecutors who are not deterred by potential collateral consequences 
or the difficulty of prosecuting corporations, the fact that many large corpora-
tions are organizationally complex still makes it challenging to convict.143 
There are many layers to a corporation and most senior officers and directors 
have little to do with the day-to-day operations of the company.144 Further-
more, even if the executives are involved in day-to-day operations, the direc-
tors and high-level executives are sophisticated enough to know how to appear 
to be separated.145 Due to this organizational complexity, it is often difficult for 
prosecutors to prove executives had the mens rea necessary for conviction.146 
Further, the disparity in resources that the Justice Department has compared to 
the corporations it seeks to prosecute also makes it difficult to prosecute.147 
The Justice Department has a finite amount of resources, so it has to be strate-
gic in which corporations it takes on.148 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Keefe, supra note 11; see also Garrett, supra note 51, at 1790 (explaining that corpora-
tions often act as the scapegoats for individuals when a corporation is criminally prosecuted). The 
fines hurt the shareholders because the corporation has to pay the fine which takes away from any 
profits. See Jill E. Fisch, Criminalization of Corporate Law: The Impact on Shareholders and Other 
Constituents, U. PA. J. BUS. & TECH. L. 91, 93 (2007) (noting that innocent constituents of corpora-
tions are punished for individual corporate misconduct). 
 142 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1791 (finding that about two-thirds of DPAs and NPAs entered 
into do not result in employees or officers being prosecuted). 
 143 See id. at 1826 (describing how organizational complexity hides fault and although it might be 
obvious that some employees are at fault, determining who knew what at what time is extremely diffi-
cult). There is also a theory that if an employee’s conduct is meant to benefit the corporation, then the 
corporation should be blamed and responsible for the harm that occurred. See id. (explaining theories 
of why a corporation is responsible for corporate misconduct by an employee). 
 144 See id. at 1825 (quoting Attorney General Holder’s opinion that top executives are often so 
insulated that it is difficult to distinguish their culpability versus the corporation’s culpability); Yates 
Memo, supra note 57, at 2 (explaining the difficult task of determining which individual made corpo-
rate decisions for the corporation at which level). 
 145 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1825 (noting the sophistication of executives and officers at 
corporations); Kaufman, supra note 135 (explaining executives rarely follow threads that lead back to 
them); see also Copeland, supra note 58, at 1909 (finding that the Justice Department’s policy of 
waiving attorney-client privilege creates an incentive for a corporation to sacrifice its employees to 
save itself). 
 146 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1832 (commenting that organizational complexity makes it dif-
ficult for prosecutors to prove intent of individuals because responsibilities are often shared); see also 
Yates Memo, supra note 57, at 2 (explaining the difficulty in establishing whether individuals had the 
knowledge and criminal intent when prosecuting corporations). 
 147 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1828–29 (noting that a substantial amount of resources would 
have to go into identifying the specific individuals responsible for the misconduct within a complex 
organization). 
 148 See Holder Memo, supra note 43, § VI.B (explaining that waivers of attorney-client privilege 
allow the government to gather statements of potential witnesses and targets without having to negoti-
ate with each of them individually); Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 30 (explaining that, by re-
questing corporations to turn in the responsible individuals, the Justice Department is demonstrating 
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B. The Problem of Using DPAs That Encourage the  
Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
After Enron and the vast amount of criticism that the Justice Department 
received for the prosecution of Arthur Andersen, the use of DPAs when prose-
cuting corporations rose.149 As DPAs became more frequent, it seemed the 
waiver of attorney-client privilege became more and more widespread as a 
precondition of cooperation in criminal prosecutions.150 Even though the waiv-
er of attorney-client privilege is considered voluntary, corporations often feel 
pressure to appear cooperative when faced with a governmental investiga-
tion.151 No company wants a fate like Enron’s or Arthur Andersen’s.152 Prose-
cutors maintain that the waiver of attorney-client privilege is not mandatory for 
a DPA or to avoid an indictment, yet, the pressure to disclose has not disap-
peared.153 For instance, in a survey conducted in 2006, seventy-five percent of 
inside and outside counsel believed that the government expected a company 
under investigation to waive attorney-client privilege.154 
                                                                                                                           
that it cannot or does not want to spend its own resources investigating these individuals); see also 
Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 121, at 319 (commenting that the Justice Depart-
ment’s real intention in requesting attorney-client waivers from corporations is to make the govern-
ment’s job easier). 
 149 See Griffin, supra note 53, at 323 (reflecting a summary of why U.S. Attorneys used DPAs 
and NPAs). Criminal trials were costly because of the collateral consequences that could result, such 
as the bankruptcy of a company. See Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1303, 1310–11 (explaining a crimi-
nal indictment was the equivalent to a death penalty for a corporation). 
 150 See Brown, supra note 30, at 898. But see Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate 
Cooperation During Investigations and Audits, 13 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 26 (2007) (explaining 
that the Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys’ law review article explained that based 
on empirical data, waivers of attorney-client privilege were the exception and not the norm). Critics of 
the Justice Department argued that the Justice Department created a “culture of waiver.” See Garrett, 
supra note 51, at 1825 (detailing the critique of the Justice Department and its use of waivers). 
 151 See Brown, supra note 30, at 899 (explaining that corporations feel extreme pressure to waive 
attorney-client privilege when facing a government investigation). Critics of the waiver of attorney-
client privilege argue that the pressure to waive attorney-client privilege is eroding the foundation and 
policy behind attorney-client privilege. See id. at 900 (noting the perspective of critics). The 2008 
Justice Manual even recognizes that a vast number of individuals in the legal community contend that 
the Justice Department’s policies created pressure for corporations to waive attorney-client privilege. 
See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1910 (describing the Justice Department’s concession on public opin-
ion of waivers). 
 152 See 10 Years Later: What Happened to the Former Employees of Enron?, supra note 2 (ex-
plaining that when Enron collapsed, it lost $60 billion in market value and thousands lost their jobs); 
see also Uhlmann, supra note 30, at 1311 (detailing that as a result of Arthur Andersen’s indictment, 
28,000 employees lost their jobs and the company subsequently filed for bankruptcy). It should be 
noted that federal prosecutors contend that the waiver of attorney-client privilege is never compelled 
or required. See Brown, supra note 30, at 899 (reflecting the Justice Department’s contention). 
 153 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1910 (explaining the perceived pressure of waiver); Larkin & 
Seibler, supra note 40, at 31 (commenting that indictment by federal prosecutors was considered a 
death sentence). 
 154 See Brown, supra note 30, at 936 (quoting the Department of Justice’s statement that it does 
not require the waiver of a corporation’s attorney-client privilege when accessing a corporation’s 
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In light of the perceived pressure for corporate waivers of attorney-client 
privilege, there is a real problem that this pressure could be eroding the under-
lying policy values of the privilege.155 The loss of attorney-client privilege in 
the corporate setting then makes it difficult for corporations to conduct accu-
rate internal investigations because the employees can no longer trust that what 
they say will be kept confidential.156 Yet, due to resource constraints, the gov-
ernment relies on this waiver to gain important and valuable information re-
garding the corporation’s misdeeds, and thus a dichotomy of important inter-
ests emerges.157 
In a corporate context, because the corporation holds the attorney-client 
privilege and not the individual, only the corporation can waive the privi-
                                                                                                                           
cooperation). But see id. at 899 (pointing to evidence that multiple surveys support the proposition 
that corporations feel like they must waive attorney-client privilege when faced with a government 
investigation); AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT—SURVEY RESULTS 3–4 (Mar. 2006), https://www.nacdl.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=17390 [https://perma.cc/66HV-ENY4] (finding that 75% of in-
side and outside counsel that answered the survey believed that the government expected a company 
under investigation to waive attorney-client privilege or work product protections). 
 155 See Brown, supra note 30, at 900 (describing why waiving attorney-client privilege has nega-
tive implications); AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, supra note 154, at 3–4 (finding that the majority of 
lawyers who answered the survey contended that the government expected a waiver of attorney-client 
privilege or work product protections); see also Mark & Pearson, supra note 150, at 28 (discussing the 
2006 American Chemistry Council survey). The underlying policy behind attorney-client privilege is 
to protect the disclosures made between an attorney and the client for the purposes of seeking legal 
advice. See Heyman, supra note 106, at 1132 (detailing the policy behind attorney-client privilege). In 
order for a lawyer to advocate zealously for his or her client, a client must be able to trust the lawyer 
enough to speak openly and honestly. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (explain-
ing the reasons for attorney-client privilege). Additionally, when employees speak with the corpora-
tion’s attorney, it is unlikely that they will have their own counsel present, which creates unfairness if 
the employees’ interviews are turned over and possibly used against them. See Copeland, supra note 
58, at 1909 (noting why waivers of attorney-client privilege with respect to corporations can be seen 
as unfair). 
 156 See Brown, supra note 30, at 923 (explaining why the waiver of attorney-client privilege has 
implications on corporate internal investigations). For example, when employees know that their 
communications are not confidential, they will unlikely be inclined to speak honestly and openly if the 
information they share would reflect poorly upon them. See id. (noting why results from internal in-
vestigations may be incorrect). There is also a perceived pressure on employees that the company 
expects them to cooperate with an internal investigation and there could be consequences for not co-
operating with the corporation’s counsel. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The My-
thology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 175 (1993) (detail-
ing the pressures that employees face during internal investigations). 
 157 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1909 (explaining that with the waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege in a corporate setting, the Justice Department is able to obtain the results from internal investiga-
tions without using its own resources). The waiver of attorney-client privilege puts a strain on the idea 
that a client should be frank and complete with the information that he or she provides to his or her 
attorney in order to ensure the best legal representation or advice. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 
U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (finding the attorney-client privilege is necessary to “encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients”). 
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lege.158 Yet, this creates somewhat of a paradox because a corporation is an 
artificial entity created by law and therefore the decision to maintain or waive 
privilege is made by the individuals authorized to act on behalf of the organi-
zation.159 Therefore, a corporation itself cannot directly waive the attorney-
client privilege; the directors and officers must waive the privilege.160 This 
unique dichotomy becomes even more complex when a corporation (in reality 
its officers and/or directors) has the power to waive attorney-client privilege 
over communications between an employee of the corporation and the corpo-
ration’s lawyer, and the employee objects to this waiver.161 
C. Judicial Intervention Over the Waivers of Attorney-Client  
Privilege in Exchange for DPAs 
Judicial intervention in the enforcement of DPAs is sparse—the majority 
of the time, DPAs are approved without controversy, even if they include a 
waiver of attorney-client privilege.162 Due to the vast prosecutorial discretion 
over DPAs and NPAs, Congress proposed legislation to promote stricter judi-
cial oversight over DPAs and NPAs.163 The proposed legislation has been 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See Commodity Futures Trading Commc’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (conclud-
ing a corporation holds attorney-client privilege); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (reiterating that a corpora-
tion can hold attorney-client privilege); see also Carol A. Poindexter, Parallel Proceedings: Internal 
Investigations and Waiver Issues, 7 DRI’S FOR THE DEFENSE 57, 58 (July 2011) (explaining that a 
corporation can both assert and waive attorney-client privilege). 
 159 See Brown, supra note 30, at 923 (illustrating the challenges of corporations waiving attorney-
client privilege); Heyman, supra note 106, at 1139 (explaining the nuances behind waiving attorney-
client privilege). This would normally be either the officers of the company or the directors. See Hey-
man, supra note 106, at 1139–40 (describing how corporations would waive attorney-client privilege). 
Officers or directors still must act in the best interest of the company when exercising a waiver or 
maintaining attorney-client privilege. See id. at 1140 (explaining the duties that officers have). 
 160 See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (detailing how corporate attorney-client privilege is waived); 
Brown, supra note 30, at 923 (explaining how attorney-client privilege is waived); see also Heyman, 
supra note 106, at 1139–40 (explaining the counterintuitive idea that corporations hold attorney-client 
privilege yet the corporations cannot directly waive the privilege). Attorney-client privilege cannot be 
waived by lower-level employees because they are not the management of the company. See Heyman, 
supra note 106, at 1140 (noting which individuals can waive attorney-client privilege for a corpora-
tion). 
 161 See RONALD J. COLOMBO, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES, 
AND LIABILITIES § 10:13 (2017) (explaining the dynamics of a corporation waiving attorney-client 
privilege). 
 162 See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 46 (D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that 
until the Speedy Trial Act is amended by Congress to provide additional judicial review over DPAs, 
the court is limited in its power to review the merits of a DPA); Zendeh, supra note 97, at 1463 (not-
ing the realities of DPAs). The district court in Saena explained that it does have the authority to reject 
a DPA that was not intended to rehabilitate a defendant’s actions. See Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 
3d at 13 (explaining the court’s powers over DPAs). 
 163 See Zendeh, supra note 97, at 1462 (noting Congress considered amending the Speedy Trial 
Act to give more power to judicial review under the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act in 
2014). 
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largely unsuccessful, and thus any oversight over DPAs has come from the 
courts.164 
For instance, in a 2014 case, Fokker Services, an aerospace service pro-
vider, was charged with conspiracy to violate and evade U.S. export laws by 
selling aviation and avionic parts to banned countries in the Middle East.165 
Despite this, the government agreed to a DPA that included a fine of $10.5 bil-
lion.166 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected 
the DPA.167 The court defended this rejection by explaining that the DPA was 
“grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Fokker Services’ conduct in a post 
9-11 world” and because it would undermine the public’s confidence in the law 
if it allowed the corporation to get away with such disgraceful conduct that 
benefited “one of the [United States’] worst enemies.”168 The court reasoned 
that a prosecutor has discretion upon whether to charge a corporation, but once 
the parties enter into a resolution that requires the court’s approval, such as a 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See id. at 1463 (explaining that the district courts do not often reject DPAs). Oversight over 
DPAs comes from the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012) (requiring any delay dur-
ing prosecution due to an agreement to be approved by the court); Zendeh, supra note 97, at 1464 
(explaining that the Speedy Trial Act’s language requires court approval before granting a motion to 
exclude time). Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, a criminal trial must begin within seventy days after 
the defendant is charged or makes his or her initial appearance. See United States v. HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 2017) (providing the procedure for the Speedy Trial Act). For 
a DPA to work as it was intended, the parties have to obtain a waiver from court exempting them from 
the Speedy Trial Act. See id. (explaining the Speedy Trial Act). Otherwise, a DPA would serve no 
purpose because if the parties do not receive an exemption from the Speedy Trial Act then the charges 
are subject to a mandatory dismissal after the seventy day period. See id. (describing the speedy trial 
act). Most DPAs call for monitoring that is far longer than seventy days. See id. at 128 (noting, for 
example, that the duration of HSBC’s DPA was five years). Additionally, some courts have found that 
they have the power to reject a DPA under their supervisory authority. See United States v. HSBC 
Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-cr-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1, *4, *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (conclud-
ing that a court has supervisory authority over a DPA when it “transgresses the bounds of lawfulness 
or propriety”). 
 165 See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 161 (D.D.C. 2015), rev’d, 818 
F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (detailing what allegations Fokker faced). Fokker is an aerospace service 
provider. See FOKKER SERVICES, http://www.fokker.com/Fokker_Services [https://perma.cc/GV9C-
2GTE] (providing more information about Fokker). 
 166 See Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d at 166 (commenting that despite the shocking conduct 
over a significant period of time, the government agreed to a lenient DPA and did not prosecute any 
individuals for their personal misconduct in the conspiracy). In fact, there were employees directly 
involved in the misconduct that continued to work at the company. See id. (providing background 
information regarding the Fokker case). 
 167 See id. at 167 (explaining that the court could not approve the DPA because the DPA was 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the corporation’s crimes). When a court does not approve a 
DPA, it denies the Motion for Exclusion of Time under the Speedy Trail Act. See id. (explaining the 
Speedy Trial Act). 
 168 See id. (concluding that a fine below the revenue generated from this illegal conduct and a 
probation period less than eighteen months was not an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
and thus, the court could not approve the DPA in its current form). 
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DPA, the court has “supervisory power” over that DPA.169 In the case of DPAs, 
this power stems from the Speedy Trial Act.170 Yet, on appeal, the District of 
Columbia Circuit found that the district court acted beyond its scope.171 The 
appellate court vacated the district court’s holding and held that the statutory 
language of the Speedy Trial Act tied the court’s approval requirement to a 
DPA for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his or her good 
conduct alone, and not to determine the merits of the DPA itself.172 
Another instance of judicial intervention regarding a DPA was in United 
States v. HSBC.173 HSBC allegedly violated the Bank Secrecy Act, the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Trading with the Enemy Act 
by allowing illegal cartels and various banned countries to move their money 
into the United States through HSBC.174 Instead of facing a trial and possible 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See id. at 165 (finding that the district court has the power to reject or approve a DPA as a 
result of its supervisory power). 
 170 See id. at 167 (concluding a court can decline to approve a DPA by denying a Motion for 
Exclusion of Time under the Speedy Trial Act); see also United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 
F.3d 733, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining a DPA can only be used if there is an exclusion of time 
granted from the Speedy Trial Act). Normally, filing a charge or an indictment would trigger the 
Speedy Trial Act’s seventy-day clock in which the trial must begin. See Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. 
Supp. 3d at 167 (describing the procedural requirements relating to the Speedy Trail Act). With a 
DPA, however, the statute allows the exclusion of the seventy-day clock in order to effectuate the 
DPA agreement. See id. (explaining the Speedy Trial Act). For instance, if the statute did not allow an 
extension of the seventy day clock, after seventy days the charges could be dismissed without the 
defendant being compliant for the full length of the DPA. See id. (explaining how the Speedy Trial 
Act operates). The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 provides time limits for completing certain stages of a 
federal criminal prosecution. See Speedy Trial, 46 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 448, 457 (2017) 
(explaining the Speedy Trial Act). For instance, the Speedy Trial Act requires an indictment to be 
filed within thirty days of an arrest or service of a summons on a defendant. See id. at 458 (detailing 
the nuances of the Speedy Trial Act). The Speedy Trial Act also specifies that a trial must commence 
within the later of seventy days of filing an indictment or within seventy days from the date the de-
fendant first appeared before a judicial officer. See id. at 459. Courts have supervisory powers in order 
to protect the integrity of the judicial process. See Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d at 165; Peter R. 
Reilly, Corporate Deferred Prosecution as Discretionary Injustice, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 839, 847 (de-
scribing the court’s powers). 
 171 See Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d at 750 (concluding the lower court went beyond its authori-
ty). 
 172 See id. at 744–45, 751 (noting the court does not have the authority to rule over the merits of a 
DPA). 
 173 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 (concluding that the court had power to 
exercise its authority over a DPA). 
 174 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332 (2012); International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Enhancement Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012); Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 4301–4341 (2012); see HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 129–30 (describing HSBC’s alleged 
criminal conduct). It was alleged that around $881 million in drug trafficking proceeds were laundered 
through HSBC. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 130 (describing the crimes that HSBC alleg-
edly committed). HSBC also allegedly allowed a Saudi bank with connections to al Qaeda to move 
money into the United States. See Keefe, supra note 11 (detailing more of HSBC’s alleged behaviors). 
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conviction, HSBC entered into a five-year DPA with the Justice Department.175 
In ultimately approving this DPA between the Justice Department and HSBC, 
Judge Gleeson of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York found that the district court had the power to approve or reject a 
DPA.176 Although this conclusion itself was rather novel, what was even more 
remarkable was Judge Gleeson’s commentary.177 Specifically, Judge Gleeson 
explained that a court has the power to reject a DPA when the requirements of 
cooperation violate the company’s attorney-client privilege.178 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately disagreed.179 The 
appellate body reasoned that the supervisory power doctrine should be used 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 129 (acknowledging the DPA that HSBC entered 
into); Steven M. Witzel, Privilege Waivers’ Role in Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, 250 
N.Y. L. J., no. 47, Sept. 5, 2013, at 1, https://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pageID=25&itemID=
6781 [https://perma.cc/2EYX-QFTT] (noting a DPA between the Department of Justice and HSBC 
was approved by a district court judge on July 1, 2013). The DPA stated that HSBC would pay a 
$1.256 billion fine, fully cooperate with the government, adopt a compliance program and admit to a 
thirty-page Statement of Facts. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 130 (providing the details of 
the DPA). In exchange for the cooperation, the DOJ would defer prosecution for five years and dis-
miss all charges if HSBC did not break any provisions in the DPA. See id. at 129 (providing the de-
tails of the HSBC DPA). 
 176 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *11 (concluding that the court had the au-
thority to approve or reject a DPA based on its supervisory power). Despite both parties’ contention 
that the court lacked authority over either the implementation or approval of a DPA, Judge Gleeson 
found that the supervisory power permitted federal courts to supervise “the administration of criminal 
justice” before them. See id. at *4–5 (explaining the court’s powers). Judge Gleeson theorized that 
once the DPA was placed on the court’s docket, the parties subjected themselves to the court’s author-
ity. See id. at *5 (concluding if the DPA made it onto the court’s docket, the court had authority over 
it). Judge Gleeson found that his supervisory power came from U.S. Supreme Court cases that af-
firmed one of the purposes of supervisory power is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. See 
id. at *4 (describing where the court’s supervisory powers came from); Reilly, supra note 170, at 847 
(explaining one purpose of supervisory powers is to protect the judicial process). 
 177 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 131 (explaining that the district court understood its 
exercise of supervisory power over a DPA was an innovative and unique approach); HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A., 2013 WL 3306161 at *6 (recognizing that the supervisory power over a DPA was novel and is 
normally requested by the defendant when the defendant suspects or alleges impropriety). Judge 
Gleeson found that when a DPA or its implementation transgressed the bounds of lawfulness or pro-
priety, judicial intervention was necessary. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161 at *6 (de-
scribing when judicial intervention was needed over a DPA). 
 178 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161 at *6 (explaining the numerous instances that 
might require the court to use its supervisory power). 
 179 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 135 (concluding the district court erred in recognizing 
the separation of powers by giving itself the authority to supervise the implementation of a DPA with-
out evidence of wrongdoing); Copeland, supra note 58, at 1910 (explaining the Justice Department’s 
policies have forced corporations to waive attorney-client privilege). The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit conceded supervisory powers could be used by the court but they should 
be used infrequently. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 136 (holding supervisory powers should 
be used in exceptional circumstances). The Second Circuit reasoned that exercising supervisory power 
over DPAs when there is no concrete evidence of impropriety turns the presumption of prosecutorial 
discretion upside down. See id. (concluding that to invoke supervisory power there had to be hard 
evidence of an impropriety). 
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cautiously.180 It went on to state that the district court would have reason to 
invoke its supervisory power over the implementation of a DPA if there was 
actual evidence of misconduct, but the court cannot invoke its supervisory 
power “just in case” there might be misconduct.181 For instance, the Second 
Circuit theorized that if the district court had actual knowledge that the Justice 
Department forced a corporation to waive attorney-client privilege, that might 
be enough to invoke the court’s supervisory power over the DPA.182 
III. CONGRESS MUST ACT TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC  
FROM CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 
Attorney-client privilege is one of the most fundamental and historical 
privileges recognized in law, yet, it is slowly eroding because of the pressure 
that corporations feel to waive this privilege when being investigated.183 If the 
government is serious about deterring corporate misconduct, it must start pros-
ecuting high-level executives by conducting its own investigations and not re-
lying on corporations to waive attorney-client privilege.184 If the government 
cannot conduct its own investigations, Congress must step in to prevent attor-
ney-client privilege from disappearing in a corporate context.185 This portion 
of the Note proceeds in three parts.186 The first section argues that allowing 
corporations to waive attorney-client privilege erodes the fundamental princi-
ples underlying the privilege.187 The second section avers that the Justice De-
partment should conduct its own investigations in order both to preserve the 
attorney-client privilege and to hold individuals responsible for corporate mis-
                                                                                                                           
 180 See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 135 (explaining the supervisory power doctrine is a 
remarkable judicial power that should be used infrequently). 
 181 See id. at 137 (finding that the court cannot monitor DPAs based on the hypothetical situation 
where misconduct could occur). 
 182 See id. (explaining that if there was actual misconduct by the prosecutor in entering the DPA, 
the district court might have the power to invoke its supervisory power). 
 183 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting attorney-client privilege is the 
oldest privilege known in common law); Brown, supra note 30, at 936 (explaining the emphasis the 
Holder Memo places on waiving attorney-client privilege); Heyman, supra note 106, at 1132–33 (ex-
plaining how attorney-client privilege has its origins in Anglo-American jurisprudence); Mark & 
Pearson, supra note 150, at 1 (finding that from 1997 to 2007 the prosecution of corporations was 
characterized by the erosion of attorney-client privilege). 
 184 See Zales, supra note 8, at 179 (explaining that to deter corporate misconduct, executives need 
to be scared of breaking the law); Kaufman, supra note 135 (corporations are unlikely to waive attor-
ney-client privilege when the investigation leads to the executives and CEOs). 
 185 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1795 (explaining the idea that lower-level employees get sacri-
ficed when corporate management waives attorney-client privilege); see also United States v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 132 F. Supp. 3d 558, 566–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (concluding that Wells Fargo can 
elect to waive its attorney-client privilege, not an employee). 
 186 See infra notes 190–220 and accompanying text. 
 187 See infra notes 190–204 and accompanying text. 
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conduct.188 The third section proposes that Congress should enact a statute that 
either bars the waiver of corporate attorney-client privilege in exchange for a 
DPA or NPA or allows individuals to estop the government from using privi-
leged information against them.189 
A. Corporations Waiving Attorney-Client Privilege  
Erodes the Privilege Itself 
The attorney-client privilege is one of the most established privileges in 
the United States.190 It serves an effective role of encouraging frank and honest 
conversation with one’s counsel, and without it, an attorney is limited in his or 
her ability to advocate zealously.191 Few, if any, legal scholars or practitioners 
doubt how important the attorney-client privilege is, and yet its sanctity has 
drastically been minimized when it comes to corporations.192 
More often than not, when there is an allegation of corporate misconduct, 
the corporation conducts an internal investigation.193 In order to conduct a 
thorough investigation, there must be some expectation of confidence so that 
the counsel can obtain the relevant and accurate facts.194 The issue with inter-
nal investigations is that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the corpora-
tion, meaning the corporation can choose to waive it and turn over protected 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See infra notes 205–208 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 209–220 and accompanying text. 
 190 See Heyman, supra note 106, at 1132–33 (noting how the attorney-client privilege is rooted in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence and is one of the most important privileges). Congress has allowed the 
attorney-client privilege to evolve with the times by not codifying and instead allowing it to develop 
in the federal courts according to reason and experience. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 
47 (1980) (explaining the adaptability of attorney-client privilege). 
 191 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (finding the attorney-client privilege necessary to ensure candid and 
honest communication between an attorney and his or her client); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (explain-
ing why attorney-client privilege is necessary); Heyman, supra note 106, at 1133 (describing the im-
portance of attorney-client privilege). 
 192 See Brown, supra note 30, at 900 (noting that some find that the Justice Department’s pressure 
to waive attorney-client privilege is eroding the foundation and policy behind attorney-client privi-
lege); Developments in White Collar Criminal Law and the Culture of Waiver, supra note 25, at 203–
04 (explaining that the Justice Department’s policy is forcing corporations to waive attorney-client 
privilege). 
 193 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1917 (commenting that when a corporation hears of miscon-
duct, it often conducts an internal investigation to see what the potential costs will be). The investiga-
tion is conducted by counsel and therefore protected by attorney-client privilege. See id. at 1902 (de-
scribing an internal investigation). Corporate internal investigations are important because they allow 
a corporation to determine who was responsible for any misconduct and what liability could result 
from that misconduct. See id. at 1917 (noting the importance of internal investigations). 
 194 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (detailing why attorney-client privilege is necessary); Trammel, 
445 U.S. at 51 (for why attorney-client privilege is important); Heyman, supra note 106, at 1133 (ex-
plaining that there needs to be complete honesty for attorneys to advocate zealously for their clients). 
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communications by its employees to the government.195 Employees often feel 
pressure to participate in internal investigations, but if an employee knows that 
a corporation may waive privilege and turn the information over to the prose-
cution, there is less of an incentive to be frank with the corporation’s attorney, 
which may lead to an investigation that is not entirely accurate.196 This slip-
pery slope continues when this potentially inaccurate investigation is turned 
over and relied upon by the Justice Department when a NPA or DPA is agreed 
to.197 Essentially, corporations are getting lenient deals, and employees are po-
tentially being prosecuted, based on a potentially faulty internal investiga-
tion.198 
Furthermore, when a corporation is allowed to waive its attorney-client 
privilege, the people deciding to waive this attorney-client privilege are the 
executives and directors.199 This puts the executives and directors at an ex-
tremely unfair vantage point because, if the results of the investigation lead 
back to them, they likely would not waive the privilege.200 Alternatively, if the 
results lead to a lower-level employee who is not involved in the decision-
making process of waiving the attorney-client privilege, the executives are likely 
to waive the attorney-client privilege and get a better deal for the corporation.201 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Heyman, supra note 106, at 1140 (explaining that the decision to waive privilege is made 
by the corporation’s management). 
 196 See Brown, supra note 30, at 923 (commenting that when employees know what they say is 
not protected by attorney-client privilege it defeats the justification for attorney-client privilege); 
Thornburg, supra note 156, at 175 (noting employees often feel pressure to cooperate in internal in-
vestigations for fear of getting fired or looking uncooperative). 
 197 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1901–02 (commenting that the Justice Department significant-
ly relies on corporations turning over their internal investigations); Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 
30 (noting that because of the obstacles of prosecuting corporations and individuals within the corpo-
ration, it is not surprising that the government enlists private parties to do the investigating); Thorn-
burg, supra note 156, at 175 (explaining that legal advice based on incomplete facts can be unrelia-
ble). Often times corporations will waive attorney-client privilege in order to obtain an NPA or DPA. 
See Brown, supra note 30, at 898–99 (providing the reasons a corporation might waive attorney-client 
privilege). 
 198 See Thornburg, supra note 156, at 175 (explaining that if employees are not honest with the 
corporation’s counsel then the lawyer’s advice is only based on part of the relevant facts). It also poses 
problems for the corporation if there are not proper incentives to encourage its employees to be honest 
with its counsel. See id. (commenting on the problems associated with the waiver of attorney-client 
privilege as it relates to corporations). 
 199 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (explain-
ing that a corporation’s management has the power to waive attorney-client privilege). The corpora-
tion’s management is usually its directors and officers. See id. (providing background on the corpora-
tion’s management). 
 200 See Kaufman, supra note 135 (noting the power that executives have over attorney-client 
privilege for corporations). 
 201 See id. (explaining the consequences that the lower-level employees face if attorney-client 
privilege is waived for the corporation). 
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In order to deter criminal behavior, the executives need to be scared.202 Alt-
hough the benefits of waiving attorney-client privilege in order to get a better 
deal cannot be denied, it is insufficient to deter future misconduct.203 If any-
thing, this system allows executives to use the attorney-client privilege as both 
a shield and a sword—thereafter, the decision to break the law may be evaluat-
ed as nothing more than the cost of doing business, not a punishment.204 
B. The Justice Department Must Conduct Its Own Investigations  
to Ensure Individuals Are Held Responsible 
The Justice Department should be conducting its own investigations to 
reduce the potential of a coerced waiver of attorney-client privilege.205 If the 
Justice Department is serious about deterring future corporate crime, it needs 
to switch its current approach of relying on what the executives and officers of 
corporations allow it to know and perform its own investigative work.206 Alt-
hough it will take more resources, the Justice Department has been effective in 
the past working with lower-level employees and granting them immunity in 
order to assure their cooperation against higher-level culpable employees.207 
By conducting its own investigations, not only will the Justice Department 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Zales, supra note 8, at 179 (commenting that executives should have a fear of being pun-
ished in order to deter corporate misconduct). 
 203 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1910 (commenting that corporations often feel coerced to 
waive attorney-client privilege to receive cooperation credit); Zales, supra note 8, at 179 (explaining 
that there needs to be real consequences for corporations if they are involved in criminal misconduct). 
 204 See Kaufman, supra note 135 (finding executives were not prosecuted after the financial crisis 
and just paid fines); Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 32 (explaining the Yates Memo creates a 
problem if corporate management is skilled and able to sacrifice lower-level employees). If corpora-
tions know that if they waive attorney-client privilege they will get an NPA or DPA and only have to 
pay a fine, the executives or directors could abuse this leniency by the Justice Department and not 
allow the internal investigation to lead back to them, thus getting away with nothing more than a slap 
on the wrist. See Kaufman, supra note 135 (noting how most corporations just had to pay fines after 
the financial crisis). The executives and officers use the attorney-client privilege as a shield when they 
assert it to protect themselves from their wrongdoings and use it as a sword when an investigation 
does not lead back to them by turning it over to the government in favor of a better outcome. See id. 
(commenting on how the corporations may just pay fines rather than face punishment); Garrett, supra 
note 51, at 1795 (explaining that because the executives are negotiating with the prosecutors there is 
an incentive to sacrifice lower-level employees in order to save themselves). 
 205 See Brown, supra note 30, at 909 (describing critiques of waiver of attorney-client privilege 
for corporations); Copeland, supra note 58, at 1916 (noting that corporate internal investigations are 
basically conducted for the government, therefore a corporation’s counsel is more or less an agent for 
the government). 
 206 See Zales, supra note 8, at 179 (finding that to deter corporate misconduct, executives need to 
be scared of breaking the law); Kaufman, supra note 135 (explaining corporations are unlikely to 
waive attorney-client privilege when the investigation leads to the executives and CEOs). 
 207 See Bayot & Farzad, supra note 4 (detailing the sentencing of a WorldCom former executive). 
In the prosecution of WorldCom, the Justice Department was able to prosecute the CEO by providing 
employees lower on the corporate ladder with immunity or lenient deals in exchange for cooperation. 
See id. (explaining how the Justice Department was able to prosecute the former CEO of WorldCom). 
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have a better chance at deterring future misconduct, but it will also preserve 
the sanctity of attorney-client privilege.208 
C. Congress Must Act to Prevent the Corporate  
Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
If corporations continue to be encouraged, whether explicitly or implicit-
ly, to waive attorney-client privilege in exchange for better plea deals or out-
comes, legislation should be passed to allow individuals to estop the govern-
ment from using that privileged information against them.209 Employees can-
not protect the sanctity of attorney-client privilege in a corporate setting be-
cause the privilege belongs to the corporation, not the employees.210 Employ-
ees can be put in incredibly tough situations where they are pressured into talk-
ing with corporate counsel because they depend on the corporation for their 
job and are worried about the consequences of appearing uncooperative.211 On 
the one hand, this pressure may force employees to incriminate themselves 
because any of the protected information with the corporation’s counsel can be 
waived by the corporation.212 On the other hand, the knowledgeable employees 
who know their conversations are not protected may not communicate unfa-
vorable information in an internal investigation.213 This potentially inaccurate 
information can then be leveraged by the corporation to obtain a DPA, as a 
corporation facing a possible indictment will try to avoid a death sentence like 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See Zales, supra note 8, at 179 (finding executives must be punished to deter future corporate 
crime). If the Justice Department conducts its own investigation, it will not need to rely so heavily on 
the corporation’s internal investigation and thus the perceived coercion of pressing corporations to 
waive attorney-client privilege will be eliminated. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1901 (explaining 
how the Justice Department relies on the results from internal investigations); see also Brown, supra 
note 30, at 899 (explaining that when faced with a government investigation, corporations often feel 
severe pressure to waive attorney-client privilege). 
 209 See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1795 (explaining the idea that lower-level employees get sacri-
ficed by corporate management); Kaufman, supra note 135 (noting high-level employees rarely are 
prosecuted post Enron). It is often the expendable and lower-level employees that get hurt when attor-
ney-client privilege is asserted or waived. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 132 F. Supp. 
3d 558, 566–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that a lower-level employee could not waive the corpora-
tion’s attorney-client to assert a defense to criminal charges). 
 210 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67 (concluding that only Wells Fargo 
itself can elect to waive its attorney-client privilege, not an employee); Brown, supra note 30, at 923 
(explaining the attorney-client privilege is for the corporations and not the individuals working for the 
corporation). 
 211 See Thornburg, supra note 156, at 175 (noting employees often feel a sense of loyalty to their 
company and are worried about being seen as uncooperative). 
 212 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67 (finding that an individual could not 
waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege even to assert a defense in order to escape criminal 
culpability). 
 213 See Brown, supra note 30, at 923 (explaining employees are unlikely to disclose information 
that paints them in a negative light). 
1450 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1415 
Enron’s that results in the Justice Department’s reliance on a possibly inaccu-
rate and/or misleading internal investigation.214 
Courts cannot be relied upon to protect the sanctity of attorney-client privi-
lege either because it is fairly evident that the courts do not have the power to 
protect attorney-client privilege when it is waived in exchange for a DPA.215 
Thus, Congress must pass legislation that prevents corporations from waiving 
attorney-client privilege unless the employees can protect themselves and estop 
the government from using that privileged information against them.216 
If Congress truly wants to deter corporate misconduct and avoid another 
situation like HSBC, where the individuals who laundered money for banks 
associated with terrorists and drug cartels got off scot-free, it must prevent the 
corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege.217 This can be done with a statute 
similar to the proposed Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act that would 
specifically bar the waiver of attorney-client privilege in exchange for a DPA 
or NPA.218 If a statute was enacted to prevent this waiver of attorney-client 
privilege in exchange for a DPA or NPA, it would not only give the courts the 
power to protect against such waiver, but it would also protect the sanctity and 
the long-recognized importance of the privilege.219 The Justice Department 
would, thus, be forced to conduct its own investigations so higher-level execu-
                                                                                                                           
 214 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1909 (explaining that with the waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege in a corporate setting, the Justice Department is able to obtain the results from internal investiga-
tions without using its own resources); Larkin & Seibler, supra note 40, at 31 (finding that in the last 
decade, corporations often enter into a pretrial settlement and pay a fine rather than face the prospect 
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215See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that the 
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Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 46 (D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that Congress must amend the Speedy Trial 
Act in order to allow more judicial oversight over DPAs). 
 216 See Copeland, supra note 58, at 1918–19 (explaining that an employee may not know that a 
corporation’s interests are not aligned with his or hers during an internal investigation and is not pro-
vided with his or her own attorney and the protections of the Fifth Amendment). 
 217 See Keefe, supra note 11 (explaining no executive was prosecuted as a result of HSBC’s mis-
conduct and the corporation only had to pay a fine that equated to one month’s worth of profits). 
 218 See Zendeh, supra note 97, at 1462 (explaining that the proposed Accountability in Deferred 
Prosecution Act had a section that recommended judicial approval for DPAs). 
 219 See id. (noting Congress considered altering the Speedy Trial Act to give more power to judi-
cial review over DPAs). Barring the corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege would also allow 
employees to fully disclose relevant information to the corporation’s counsel and thus enable counsel 
to represent the corporation with accurate and complete knowledge. See Thornburg, supra note 156, at 
175 (noting the benefits of forbidding corporations to waive attorney-client privilege). 
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tives could be prosecuted, and corporate misconduct could be further de-
terred.220 
CONCLUSION 
Corporations should not be allowed to waive their attorney-client privi-
lege because it violates the founding principles behind the creation of the privi-
lege. If a corporation can waive this privilege, and in many cases is encouraged 
to waive this privileged information, then either the information that employ-
ees tell the corporation’s counsel during an internal investigation may hurt the 
individual or that information may be untruthful. Therefore, the Justice De-
partment’s reliance on the waiver of attorney-client privilege by the corpora-
tion is misplaced and hinders justice. 
If corporations continue to waive attorney-client privilege in hopes of ob-
taining a more lenient deal, then the legislative or executive branch must pro-
tect the individuals to whom that privileged information was revealed. The 
Justice Department needs to protect these individuals by conducting their own 
independent investigations into corporations’ misdeeds to ensure the low-
hanging employees are not the only individuals being prosecuted. Congress 
should further protect the individuals by enacting a statute that bars the waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege in exchange for a DPA. 
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